Cultural relativism revisited: Through a state prism

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 316-344

  Pollis, Adamantia ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0000912831     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.1996.0021     Document Type: Review

References (90)

1. HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979); TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK (Peter Schwab & Adamantia Pollis eds., 1982).
2. HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979); TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK (Peter Schwab & Adamantia Pollis eds., 1982).
3. In the Western tradition, there is a divide between natural rights and legal positivism as the source of rights. In addition, socialist doctrine considers economic and social rights rather than civil and political rights as fundamental. Moreover, there are a multiplicity of concepts of rights in different cultures.
4. A good example is the concept of philotimo (related to honor with specific behavioral requisites), a fundamental value in Greece that cannot be translated into English. See Adamantia Pollis, Political Implications of the Modern Greek Concept of Self, 16 BRIT. J. Soc. 29, 34 (March 1965).
5. For an excellent discussion of the absence of the notion of individualism in Japan, see KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER (1989). The author argues that the Japanese "submerge their individuality . . . because harmony and loyalty are their highest cultural values." Id. at 245.
6. More important than the notoriety which accompanied Singapore's flogging of a US teenager in 1994 for a minor incident was the argument presented by the Foreign Minister in the ASEAN conference that democracy was understood differently in Singapore than in the West.
7. It remains to be seen whether liberalization in Taiwan and South Korea will go beyond multiparty politics. For a discussion of the continuation of repressive laws in South Korea, see Richard Dicker, Associate Counsel for Human Rights Watch, Perspective on South Korea: Put the Toasts to Democracy on Hold, L.A. TIMES, 24 July 1995, at B5.
8. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing Concerns?, 36 WORLD POL. 255, 258 (Jan. 1984). Using Brazil and South Korea as illustrative cases, Donnelly refutes the trade-off theory and argues that "[a] concern for human rights must be incorporated into the heart of development planning, with development and human rights being seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing in all time frames." Id.
9. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing Concerns?, 36 WORLD POL. 255, 258 (Jan. 1984). Using Brazil and South Korea as illustrative cases, Donnelly refutes the trade-off theory and argues that "[a] concern for human rights must be incorporated into the heart of development planning, with development and human rights being seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing in all time frames." Id.
10. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing Concerns?, 36 WORLD POL. 255, 258 (Jan. 1984). Using Brazil and South Korea as illustrative cases, Donnelly refutes the trade-off theory and argues that "[a] concern for human rights must be incorporated into the heart of development planning, with development and human rights being seen as complementary and mutually reinforcing in all time frames." Id.
11. The difficulty with the paradigmatic notion of transition to democracy is beyond the scope of this study. It should be stated, however, that in replacing modernization theory the paradigmatic notion of transitions assumes that there is an inexorable movement to "democracy which, of course, is the Western model.
12. One underlying factor in the recent election results in Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, in which excommunists were returned to power, might be the continuing salience of economic and social rights.
13. In a recent volume on Latin America, Laura Kalmanowiecki states "True democratization involves bringing the state's coercive apparatus under public accountability." Laura Kalmanowiecki, Police, People, and Preemption in Argentina, in VICILANTISM AND THE STATE IN MODERN LATIN AMERICA: ESSAYS ON EXTRALEGAL VIOLENCE 48 (Martha K. Huggins ed., 1991). In her introduction to that volume, Martha Huggins' speaks of the continuation of "covert state violence against citizens (death squads and paramilitary/parapolice violence); and on-duty official police violence against alleged criminals and subversives." Id. at 3.
14. There is as yet little scholarly work on the fate of the variety of security forces in the transitions from authoritarian rule. An interesting account of their continued power is Amy Knight, The Real Winner in Chechnya: The K.G.B., N.Y. TIMES, 2 Feb. 1995, at A23.
15. In some cases, such as Russia, freedom seems to be equated with unbridled pursuit of one's individual self-interest, thus fulfilling the classical liberal laissez-faire doctrine. In Western Europe, however, liberalism implicitly presupposed a community and constraints on individual behavior imposed by the rule of law.
16. Initially, the liberal doctrine of individual human rights excluded women and nonwhites. These groups were considered not to possess the capacity of rationality, and hence were not entitled to equal rights. This study does not consider these issues. Demands for gender and racial equality are forceful throughout the world.
17. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 11-35 (1980) ("[p]rior to the rise of capitalism in the West, under feudalism, although exploitative, lords had obligations towards their serfs which provided for their basic needs").
18. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights - the Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 19 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992).
19. ALLISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990).
20. One critical issue that is not included in this study is that of gender. It is too vast a subject to be dealt with within the constraints of this study. In Africa, the issue is complex, whereas in some Asian countries, such as Japan, women have been repressed in all spheres of life.
21. For a discussion of state sovereignty and noninterference, particularly as it pertains to intervention involving the use of force, see Kelly K. Pease & David P. Forsythe, Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World Politics, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 290 (1993).
22. The European countries who are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are a partial exception. Underpinned by a cultural consensus on human rights, they generally accept the findings of the European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court. Furthermore, it should be noted that nongovernmental organizations are forceful advocates of human rights. They function as pressure groups on international and regional organizations, they condemn human rights abuses by governments, and they defend victims.
23. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 Dec. 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force 12 Jan. 1951) (entered into force for U.S. 23 Feb. 1989).
24. Whereas the Weberian notion of the state as possessing the monopoly of force has become universalized, his contention that a modern state is ruled largely by consensus based on the legitimacy of legal-rational authority has little credence in many states.
25. Mahbubani Kishore, The Pacific Way, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 100, 100-111 (Jan./Feb. 1995). In this article, Mahbubani, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, attacks the West for being ethnocentric. Although he does not spell out the East Asian notions of democracy and human rights, he makes clear that modernization has not eroded their cultural traditions. He states that "[a] belief in the universality of one's ideas can lead to an inability to accept the principle of diversity." Id. at 105.
26. The ancient Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, conceptualized man as an integral member of concentric groups and not as atomized individuals.
27. Foremost among those advocating state theory is Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 9-18 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1985).
28. JOEL S. MIGDAL, STRONG SOCIETIES AND WEAK STATES: STATE-SOCETY RELATIONS AND STATE CAPABILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD 24-33 (1988). The author speaks of weak states as those in which the strength of a "melange of social organizations" is such as to deny the state effective social control. Id. at 28.
29. See D. Michael Shafer, Sectors, States, and Social Forces: Korea and Zambia Confront Economic Restructuring, 22 COMP. POL. 127 (Jan. 1990).
30. Interestingly, while strong states are advocated for "third world" countries, it is recognized that the autonomy of the state is limited in industrialized countries such as the United States. See Skocpol, supra note 24, at 12-13. She also states, in reference to the United States, that autonomous state contributions can be made even by a weak state. Id.
31. See Ted Robert Gurr, The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 53-54 (Michael Stohl & George A. Lopez eds., 1986).
32. John F. McCamant, Domination, State Power, and Political Repression, in STATE ORGANIZED TERROR: THE CASE OF VIOLENT INTERNAL REPRESSION 50 (P. Timothy Bushnell et al. eds., 1991).
33. George A. Lopez, A Scheme for the Analysis of Government as Terrorist, in THE STATE AS TERRORIST: THE DYNAMICS OF GOVERNMENTAL VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION 60 (Michael Stohl & George A. Lopez eds., 1984).
34. Although he was not referring to security apparatuses MICDAL, supra note 25, at 5, states that even in weak states, "in terms of penetration, many states have demonstrated impressive capabilities, changing the very nature of institutional life even in distant villages and towns"; Haiti, a "weak" state is an excellent example. See Pnina Lahav, The Chef de Section: Structure and Functions of Haiti's Basic Administrative Institution, in WORKING PAPERS IN HAITIAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE 56-66 (Sidney W. Mintz ed., 1975) for a detailed discussion of the police and military functions of the local, rural chiefs in Haiti. The recent transition to "democracy" with the return of Jean-Bertrand Aristide does not seem to have diminished the continuing power of the local chiefs.
35. A distinction is frequently made between ethnic and civic nationalisms. In ethnic nationalism, ethnicity is synonymous with national identity; primordial claims are made. Civic nationalism bases national identity on territory, snared institutions, and historical experience. See ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY 11-12 (1991).
36. Recently, scholars from non-Western societies have begun to challenge the epistemological foundations and normative prescriptions of the Western paradigm of modernity. See, e.g., Tariq Banuri, Modernization and its Discontents: A Cultural Perspective on Theories of Development, in DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE 73 (Frédérique A. Marglin & Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1991).
37. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by The World Conference on Human Rights, 2 June 1993, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 (Part I), at 29 (13 Oct. 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. See also WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION, JUNE 1993 (United Nations Department of Public Information ed., 1993) [hereinafter WORLD CONFERENCE].The one recommendation of the Conference which has been implemented is the decision by the UN General Assembly to establish a High Commissioner for Human Rights.
38. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by The World Conference on Human Rights, 2 June 1993, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 (Part I), at 29 (13 Oct. 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. See also WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION, JUNE 1993 (United Nations Department of Public Information ed., 1993) [hereinafter WORLD CONFERENCE].The one recommendation of the Conference which has been implemented is the decision by the UN General Assembly to establish a High Commissioner for Human Rights.
39. WORLD CONFERENCE, supra note 34, ¶ ¶ 1, 5 & 8.
40. For a recent survey of the universalism vs. cultural relativism debate in the context of various regional and international instruments, including the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, see Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740 (1994).
41. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 Mar. 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
42. WORLD CONFERENCE, supra note 34, at 40.
43. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 3 Jan. 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 49, U.M. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
44. The Declaration includes many of the rights that have been considered and acted upon by the General Assembly since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the right to development, minority rights, the right to self-determination, rights of the child, rights of indigenous peoples, women's rights, rights of the disabled, genocide, the right to asylum, racism, education, and the environment.
45. Long extracts from the texts of some of the preparatory declarations appeared in THE UNESCO COURIER 40 (March 1994) (citing the Bangkok Declaration ¶ 8).
46. See three statements delivered at the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993, the text of which can be found in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (James T. H. Hang, 1995): the Statement by Wong Kan Seng, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Singapore, Vienna, 16 June 1993, at 242; the Statement by Ali Alatas, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, Vienna, 14 June 1993, at 228; and the Statement by Liu Huaqiu, Head of the Chinese Delegation, Vienna, 17 June 1993, at 213.
47. See Michael Vatikiotis & Robert Delfs, Cultural Divide: East Asia Claims the Right to Make its Own Rules, FAR E. ECON. REV., 17 June 1993, at 20. At the Vienna Conference, the one other Asian state that proclaimed its support of Western democracy and individual human rights was the Philippines.
48. I am indebted to Tsuneo Watanabe for his penetrating analysis contrasting Western and Japanese conceptions of rights. 5ee Tsuneo Watanabe, Human Rights in Japanese Society: Interpersonal Relationships, Conflict and Ideology (1995) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research) (on file with author).
49. There are, however, extensive violations of the rights of minorities (Ainu, Burakumin, and Koreans) both as individuals and as communities. See id. at 48-62.
50. This is not to argue that competition is not a driving force in Japan. Competition is not at the individual level, but among integrated groups whose members are fiercely loyal to their particular in-group.
51. In many cultures, individualism is equated with selfishness and is considered an undesirable trait.
52. The category of East Asian states is reminiscent of the modernization theorists who lumped the non-Western world into one category, "traditional."
53. See James C. Hsiung, Human Rights in an East Asian Perspective in HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA: A CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (James C. Hsiung ed., 1986).
54. Kenneth K. Inada, A Buddhist Response to the Nature of Human Rights, in ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 91, 93 (Claude E. Welch Jr. & Virginia A. Leary eds., 1990) ("Asian lives in general [are] grounded in a holistic cosmological framework").
55. I will not be concerned with states such as Vietnam and the Philippines which were under French and US rule respectively.
56. This is not to say that violence, wars, the conquering of peoples, and brutality did not exist in the past. The significant difference in modern times is the institutionalization of terror.
57. A coalition of Asian NGOs recently drafted a proposal for the creation of an Asian Charter. However, the Asian NGOs have not met yet to draft such a charter. See ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, TOWARDS AN ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTER (1994). Singapore, Burma and three communist countries, China, Vietnam, and North Korea, are the only Asian states that do not have human rights organizations. See Sidney Jones, The Organic Growth: Asian NGOs Have Come Into Their Own, FAR E. ECON. REV., 17 June 1993, at 23.
58. A coalition of Asian NGOs recently drafted a proposal for the creation of an Asian Charter. However, the Asian NGOs have not met yet to draft such a charter. See ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, TOWARDS AN ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTER (1994). Singapore, Burma and three communist countries, China, Vietnam, and North Korea, are the only Asian states that do not have human rights organizations. See Sidney Jones, The Organic Growth: Asian NGOs Have Come Into Their Own, FAR E. ECON. REV., 17 June 1993, at 23.
59. Vatikiotis & Delfs, supra note 43, at 20.
60. Human rights NGOs have documented extensively human rights violations in Asian countries. With regard to Indonesia, see, for example, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POWER AND IMPUNITY: HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE NEW ORDER (1994) (documenting practices such as torture and killings against targeted groups - East Timoreses, workers, farmers, or intellectuals - anyone opposed to governmental policies).
61. The East Asian states are judged by their own criteria, not by Western standards. Western liberalism does not consider economic and social rights as fundamental.
62. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, at 129-31 (1994).
63. Id. at 132-33.
64. Id. at 134-35.
65. See JULIUS K. NYERERE, UJAMAA - ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM (1968); LĖOPOLD SÉDAR SENGHOR, ON AFRICAN SOCIALISM (1964).
66. See JULIUS K. NYERERE, UJAMAA - ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM (1968); LĖOPOLD SÉDAR SENGHOR, ON AFRICAN SOCIALISM (1964).
67. See Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson, The I.M.F. and Economic and Social Human Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 227 (1986); Adamantia Pollis, Development, Growth and Human Rights: The Case of Turkey, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL VIEWS 237 (David P. Forsythe ed., 1989).
68. See Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson, The I.M.F. and Economic and Social Human Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 227 (1986); Adamantia Pollis, Development, Growth and Human Rights: The Case of Turkey, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL VIEWS 237 (David P. Forsythe ed., 1989).
69. See Miles Wolpin, State Terrorism and Repression in the Third World: Parameters and Prospects, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION 97 (Michael Stohl & George A. Lopez eds., 1986).
70. Some African states such as Tanzania, Angola, and Mozambique, enunciated an ideology beyond national integration, namely socialism, but their strategies for development also failed.
71. See Eddison J.M. Zvobgo, A Third World View, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 90 (Donald P. Kommers & G.D. Loescher eds., 1979). Kwasi Wiredu, An Akan Perspective on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 244 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990) argues the intrinsic value of all humans, dignity and respect as fundamental values.
72. See Eddison J.M. Zvobgo, A Third World View, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 90 (Donald P. Kommers & G.D. Loescher eds., 1979). Kwasi Wiredu, An Akan Perspective on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 244 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990) argues the intrinsic value of all humans, dignity and respect as fundamental values.
73. For a good overall discussion, see Tom W. Bennett, Human Rights and the African Cultural Tradition, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 263 (Wolfgang Schmale ed., 1993).
74. Recently, some serious questioning has taken place as to the primordial assumptions regarding tribalism in Africa. See LEROY VAIL, THE CREATION OF TRIBALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1989). The author states "empirical evidence shows clearly that ethnic consciousness is very much a new phenomenon, an ideological construct." Id. at 3. See also BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN 99-102 (1992).
75. Recently, some serious questioning has taken place as to the primordial assumptions regarding tribalism in Africa. See LEROY VAIL, THE CREATION OF TRIBALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1989). The author states "empirical evidence shows clearly that ethnic consciousness is very much a new phenomenon, an ideological construct." Id. at 3. See also BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN 99-102 (1992).
76. Recently, some serious questioning has taken place as to the primordial assumptions regarding tribalism in Africa. See LEROY VAIL, THE CREATION OF TRIBALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (1989). The author states "empirical evidence shows clearly that ethnic consciousness is very much a new phenomenon, an ideological construct." Id. at 3. See also BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN 99-102 (1992).
77. Zvobgo, supra note 64, at 93-94.
78. It is not being argued that traditional African society and values fulfilled Henri Rousseau's "noble savage." There is no intention to romanticize traditional Africa. The thrust of this study is the impact of modernity on African concepts and values.
79. The human rights situation has deteriorated since the most recent military coup in Nigeria executed by General Abacha in 1993. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NIGERIA: MILITARY GOVERNMENT CLAMPDOWN ON OPPOSITION (11 Nov. 1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, NIGERIA: "THE DAWN OF A NEW DARK AGE" (Oct. 1994). For the government's role in fomenting ethnic violence, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, NIGERIA: THE OCONI CRISIS: A CASE-STUDY OF MILITARY REPRESSION IN SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA (July 1995).
80. The human rights situation has deteriorated since the most recent military coup in Nigeria executed by General Abacha in 1993. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NIGERIA: MILITARY GOVERNMENT CLAMPDOWN ON OPPOSITION (11 Nov. 1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, NIGERIA: "THE DAWN OF A NEW DARK AGE" (Oct. 1994). For the government's role in fomenting ethnic violence, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, NIGERIA: THE OCONI CRISIS: A CASE-STUDY OF MILITARY REPRESSION IN SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA (July 1995).
81. The human rights situation has deteriorated since the most recent military coup in Nigeria executed by General Abacha in 1993. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NIGERIA: MILITARY GOVERNMENT CLAMPDOWN ON OPPOSITION (11 Nov. 1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, NIGERIA: "THE DAWN OF A NEW DARK AGE" (Oct. 1994). For the government's role in fomenting ethnic violence, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, NIGERIA: THE OCONI CRISIS: A CASE-STUDY OF MILITARY REPRESSION IN SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA (July 1995).
82. Harassment, torture, and extrajudicial killings directed at political opponents, journalists, and other dissident groups are on the increase. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1995, at 181-83 (1995).
83. Information on human rights abuses and repression in Ghana is sparse. The targets are primarily opposition leaders and journalists. Id. at 139-41.
84. One such study is Harold Alderman, Downturn and Economic Recovery in Ghana: Impact on the Poor, Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program, 10 MONOGRAPH (Mar. 1991).
85. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 57, at 165.
86. Id. at 135.
87. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD BANK AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 323 (1992).
88. Id. at 324.
89. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 57, at 135.
90. Id. at 130.