The duration of bank relationships

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 61, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 449-475

  Ongena, Steven ^a   Smith, David C ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b Bd of Governors of the Fed Reserve   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank relationships; C41; Duration analysis; G21; Hazard models

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000820410     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00069-1     Document Type: Article

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