An approach to equilibrium selection

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 415-434

  Matsui, Akihiko ^a   Matsuyama, Kiminori ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000739821     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1995.1015     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. R. T. Boylan, Equilibria resistant to mutation, Social Science Working Paper 691, California Institute of Technology, 1990.
2. R. T. Boylan, Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals, J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992), 473-504.
3. D. Canning, Convergence to equilibrium in a sequence of games with learning, London School of Economics Discussion Paper TE/89/190, 1989.
4. H. Carlsson and E. van Damme, Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61 (1993). 989-1018.
5. R. Cooper and A. John. Coordinating coordination failures in Keynesian models. Quart. J. Econ. 103 (1988), 441-463.
6. D. W. Diamond and P. H. Dybvig, Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity, J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983), 401-419.
7. G. Ellison, Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica 61 (1993). 1047-1072.
8. J. Farrell and G. Saloner, Standardization, compatibility, and innovation, Rand J. Econ. 16 (1985), 70-83.
9. M. Feldman and C. Gilles, An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty. J. Econ. Theory 35 (1985). 26-32.
10. D. Foster and P. Young, Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. Theoret. Population Biol 38 (1990). 219-232.
11. D. Friedman. Evolutionary games in economics, Econometrica 59 (1991), 637-666.
12. D. Fudenberg and C. Harris, Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks, J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992), 420-441.
13. D. Fudenberg and D. Kreps, A theory of learning, experimentation, and equilibrium in games, unpublished, MIT and Stanford, 1988.
14. I. Gilboa and A. Matsui, Social stability and equilibrium, Econometrica 59 (1991), 859-867.
15. I. Gilboa and A. Matsui, A model of random matching, J. Math. Econ. 21 (1992), 185-197.
16. I. Gilboa and D. Samet. Absorbent stable sets, CMS-EMS Discussion Paper 935, Northwestern University, 1991.
17. J. C. Harsanyi and R. Selten, “A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, " MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 1988.
18. K. L. Judd, The law of large numbers with a continuum of iid random variables, J. Econ. Theory 35 (1985), 19-25.
19. E. Kalai and E. Lehrer, Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium, Econometrica 61 (1993), 1019-1046.
20. M. Kandori, G. J. Mailath, and R. Rob, Learning, mutations, and long run equilibrium in games, Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-56.
21. M. Kandori and R. Rob, Evolutions of equilibria in the long run, unpublished. University of Pennnsylvania, 1992.
22. E. Kohlberg and J.-F. Mertens, On the strategic stability of equilibria, Econometrica 54 (1986), 1003-1037.
23. P. Krugman. Increasing returns and economic geography. J. Polit. Econ. 99 (1991), 483-499.
24. P. Krugman, “Geography and Trade, " MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 1991.
25. A. Matsui, Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies, J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992), 343-362.
26. A. Matsui, Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society, J. Econ. Theory 54 (1991), 245-258.
27. K. Matsuyama, Increasing returns, industrialization, and indeterminacy of equilibrium. Quart. J. Econ. 106 (1991), 617-650.
28. K. Matsuyama. A simple model of sectoral adjustment. Rer. Econ. Stud. 59 (1992), 375-388.
29. K. Matsuyama. The market size, entrepreneurship, and the big push, J. Japan. Int. Econ. 6 (1992), 347-364.
30. K. Matsuyama, Custom versus fashion: Path-dependence and limit cycles in a random matching game. Working Papers in Economics, E-92-11, Hoover Institution, 1992.
31. K. Matsuyama, N. Kiyotaki, and A. Matsui, Toward a theory of international currency. Rev. Econ. Stud. 60 (1993). 283-307.
32. P. Milurom and J. Roberts, Rationalizability. learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities, Econometrica 58 (1990), 1255-1277.
33. P. Milurom and J. Roberts, Adaptive and sophisticated learning in repeated normal form games. Games Econ. Behav. 3 (1991), 82-100.
34. K. M. Murphy, A Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. Industrialization and the big push. J. Polit. Econ. 97 (1989), 1003-1026.
35. J. Swinkels, Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games. Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1993), 455-484.
36. P. D. Taylor and L. B. Jonker, Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Math. Biosc. 40 (1978), 145-156.
37. H. P. Young, The evolutions of conventions, Econometrica 61 (1993), 57-84.