Central bank behavior. A positive empirical analysis

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 1981, Pages 291-315

  Frey, Bruno S ^a   Schneider, Friedrich ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000692467     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(81)90031-3     Document Type: Article

References (34)

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6. Mythology and central banking
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11. The sensitivity of fiscal-policy effects to assumptions about the behavior of the Federal Reserve
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13. Politico-economic models and cycles
14. The political business cycle A comment
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16. A politico-economic model of the United Kingdom
17. An econometric model with an endogenous government sector
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19. Some implications of endogenous stabilization policy
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23. Stabilization policy in open economies with endogenous politicians
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26. The political business cycle
27. Central bank laws and monetary policy
28. The cost of conflicting objectives in policy simulation
29. The objectives of Canadian monetary policy 1949–1961 Empirical trade-offs and the reaction function of the authorities
30. Congressional supervision of monetary policy
31. A model of Federal Reserve behavior