Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting

Public Choice

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 1987, Pages 123-139

  Austen Smith, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000691303     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: 15737101     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00123002     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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3. Election goals and strategies: Equivalent and nonequivalent strategies
4. Party policy and campaign costs in a multi-constituency model of electoral competition
5. On money, votes and policy in a democratic society
6. The economics of special interest groups: The case of the tariff
7. A collective goods model of pluralist political systems
8. Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting
9. Probabilistic voting
10. Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter is an artifact
11. The mean vs. the median in spatial voting games
12. Nonvoting and the existence of equilibrium under majority rule
13. Toward a more general theory of regulation
14. The strategy of ambiguity: Uncertainty and electoral competition
15. The economics of campaign funds
16. The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups