Equilibrium structures in vertical oligopoly

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 463-480

  Abiru, Masahiro ^a   Nahata, Babu ^b   Raychaudhuri, Subhashis ^a   Waterson, Michael ^c  

^a FUKUOKA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

D43; L42; Successive oligopoly; Vertical equilibrium structures; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000584369     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00114-0     Document Type: Article

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