What problems can dollarization solve?

Journal of Policy Modeling

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 267-277

  Eichengreen, Barry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000543474     PISSN: 01618938     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0161-8938(01)00046-1     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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