Optimal inflation targets, "Conservative" central banks, and linear inflation contracts: Comment

American Economic Review

Volumn 89, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 342-348

  Beetsma, Roel M W J ^a,b   Jensen, Henrik ^c  

^a Ministry of Economic Affairs Netherlands   (Netherlands)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000525029     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.1.342     Document Type: Note

References (17)

1. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. and Jensen, Henrik. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment." Working Paper No. 1998-11, Economic Policy Research Unit, University of Copenhagen, 1998.
2. Fischer, Stanley. "Modern Central Banking," in Forrest Capie, Stanley Fischer, Charles A. E. Goodhart, and Norbert Schnadt, eds., The future of central banking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 262-308.
3. Goodhart, Charles A. E. and Viñ als, José. "Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes," in Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, ed., Goals, guidelines, and constraints facing monetary policymakers. Boston, MA: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1994, pp. 139-87.
4. Hall, Robert E. and Mankiw, N. Gregory. "Nominal Income Targeting," in N. Gregory Mankiw, ed., Monetary policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 71-93.
5. Herrendorf, Berthold and Lockwood, Ben. "Rogoff 's 'Conservative' Central Banker Restored." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, November 1997, Pt. 1, 29(4), pp. 476-95.
6. Jonsson, Gunnar. "Monetary Politics and Unemployment Persistence." Journal of Monetary Economics , July 1997, 39 ( 2 ) , pp. 303-25. (Pubitemid 127161243)
7. Lockwood, Ben. "State-Contingent Inflation Contracts and Unemployment Persistence." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, August 1997, 29(3), pp. 286-99.
8. Lockwood, Ben and Philippopoulos, Apostolis. "Insider Power, Unemployment Dynamics and Multiple Inflation Equilibria." Economica, February 1994, 61(241) , pp. 59-77.
9. Lohmann, Susanne. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility." American Economic Review, March 1992, 82(1), pp. 273-86.
10. McCallum, Bennett T. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence." American Economic Review, May 1995 (Papers and Proceedings), 85(2), pp. 207-11.
11. Mishkin, Frederic S. and Posen, Adam S. "Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Four Countries," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review , August 1997, 3(3), pp. 9-110.
12. Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido. "Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability." Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, December 1993, 39, pp. 53-84.
13. -. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of macroeconomics, Vol. 1C. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1999 (forthcoming).
14. Rogoff, Kenneth. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target." Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1985, 100(4), pp. 1169-89.
15. Svensson, Lars E. O. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts." National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, MA) Working Paper No. 5251, September 1995.
16. -. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts." American Economic Review , March 1997, 87(1), pp. 98-114. (Pubitemid 127454249)
17. Walsh, Carl E. "Optimal Contracts for Independent Central Bankers." American Economic Review , March 1995, 85 ( 1 ) , pp. 150-67.