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1
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84896468365
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note
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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1994 meetings of the International Association for Business and Society. I am grateful for comments received from participants and reviewers for those meetings.
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2
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0001788578
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The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits
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September 13, 124 and 126
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Milton Friedman, 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits', New York Times, September 13, 1979, 32-33, 122, 124 and 126.
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(1979)
New York Times
, vol.32
, Issue.33
, pp. 122
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Friedman, M.1
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3
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0004273805
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Basic Books, Inc., New York
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Robert Nozick (Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books, Inc., New York), 167-182; and John Hospers ('The Nature of the State', The Personalist 59(4): 398-4O4).
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Anarchy, State and Utopia
, pp. 167-182
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Nozick, R.1
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4
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84896455632
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The Nature of the State
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John Hospers ('The Nature of the State', The Personalist 59(4): 398-404).
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The Personalist
, vol.59
, Issue.4
, pp. 398-404
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Hospers, J.1
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7
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84896442661
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Is Redistribution to Help the Needy Unjust?
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The arguments presented in this section and the following section are essentially the same as the arguments presented in another paper of mine on a related topic. That paper is forthcoming in 1995
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The arguments presented in this section and the following section are essentially the same as the arguments presented in another paper of mine on a related topic. That paper is, 'Is Redistribution to Help the Needy Unjust?' forthcoming in 1995 in Analysis.
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Analysis
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8
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84896472553
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note
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In essence, Nozick modifies the Lockean Proviso to this: 'A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened'. Though Nozick's modified Proviso might be an improvement on Locke's, it still faces the formidable problem of clarifying what constitutes worsening someone's position. (My view is that granting property rights which would result in people being made to suffer a loss with respect to their need satisfaction, or, granting property rights which thereby mean that people are worse off with respect to the satisfaction of their needs seem to be exactly the sorts of cases in which people's position is importantly worsened. I develop this argument and its implications more generally in this section).
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9
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84896463314
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Is Redistribution to Help the Needy Unjust?
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Ibid., 180.
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Analysis
, pp. 180
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10
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84896477737
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note
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Although Nozick recognizes the kinds of cases outlined in the cited passage as running afoul of the Lockean proviso and so legitimately curtailing or overriding property rights, he does not believe the scope of these kinds of cases is very large. He believes that the free operation of a market system will not in general run afoul of the Lockean proviso. It seems likely that Nozick just grossly underestimates the number and range of situations in which the free operation of a market system would actually run afoul of the Lockean proviso.
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11
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84896472326
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Property and Social Welfare
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This is something argued for in more detail by, for instance, in K. Kipnis and D. Meyers (eds.) (Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, NJ)
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This is something argued for in more detail by, for instance, Lawrence Becker in 'Property and Social Welfare', in K. Kipnis and D. Meyers (eds.), Economic Justice (Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, NJ), 71-86; and Stephen Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 1990, New York).
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Economic Justice
, pp. 71-86
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Becker, L.1
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12
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0004273160
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Cambridge University Press, New York
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Stephen Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 1990, New York).
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(1990)
A Theory of Property
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Munzer, S.1
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13
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84896453966
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note
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Even the fiercest libertarians acknowledge this at least in principle. As Nozick concedes, it would not be acceptable to appropriate the only well with drinkable water or the only piece of land in the middle of the ocean if this would deny others exactly what would meet a fundamental need necessary to sustain life.
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14
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84896466673
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note
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For those who claim that no unfairness would be involved, the burden of proof is on them to show how this could be the case, or to show how such accounts of property acquisition can be defensible.
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15
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84896482914
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note
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In The Right to Private Property (Clarendon Press, 1988, Oxford) Jeremy Waldron makes a contractarian argument which closely parallels this part of the argument. My argument is more general than the one presented by Waldron and seeks to be persuasive to contractarians and non-contractarians alike. Waldron's argument would seem to have little grip with noncontractarians. I think there are other avertable sticking points for Waldron. For instance, Waldron's argument turns crucially on what could be rationally agreed to. What it can be rational to agree to can vary with different starting assumptions. So, for instance, if the risk of being destitute is sufficiently small it might be rational (some might plausible argue) to agree to certain kinds of Principles of Justified Acquisition which threaten and thwart others needs, so long as one can be sure one will never be in such a situation.
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16
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84896477413
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note
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Which needs legitimately require attention? The argument works for people's most basic physical needs: adequate sustenance (food and water) and protection from the elements where necessary (minimal clothing and shelter), since these are clearly the sorts of resources at issue in the 'desert island thoughtexperiments'. Do other needs widely held to be basic, such as, needs for health care and education also demand attention if property rights are to be justified? I will gesture towards one line of arguing that it can, though I concede, this line requires further development. On one paraphrase of the main argument, taking resources is permissible so long as you leave enough for others to meet their own needs (that is, you leave enough for others to make their own way in meeting their own needs). So, your property rights are justified (initially and permanently) so long as you leave enough for others to meet their own basic needs. Perhaps this is unproblematically equivalent to, your property rights are justified (initially and permanently) so long as you leave enough for others to meet their own basic needs or provide the means (or necessary conditions) for others to meet their own basic needs. In contemporary society, 'leaving enough for others to meet their own needs' does not seem to be a viable option. So, it seems if property rights are to be defensible we must supply the necessary conditions for others to make their own way in meeting their own needs. Since minimal education and minimal health care are such necessary conditions for others to meet their needs in contemporary society, accommodating such needs is also important.
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17
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84976923215
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The Toronto Conference: Reflections on Stakeholder theory
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April 1994
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'The Toronto Conference: Reflections on Stakeholder theory', Business and Society 33(1), April 1994, pp. 82-131.
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Business and Society
, vol.33
, Issue.1
, pp. 82-131
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18
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84896441913
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Essay by Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston, April 1994
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Essay by Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston', Thomas Donaldson and Lee E. Preston, Business and Society 33(1), April 1994, 105-108.
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Business and Society
, vol.33
, Issue.1
, pp. 105-108
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Donaldson, T.1
Preston, L.E.2
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19
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84896467001
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note
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I take it as unproblematic that there are negative duties to stakeholders, that is, duties not to harm stakeholders.
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