Economic implications of imperfect quality certification

Economics Letters

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 1991, Pages 333-337

  De, Sankar ^a   Nabar, Prafulla ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000518548     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90067-U     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. The market for ‘lemons’ Qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism
2. Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games
3. Signalling games and stable equilibria
4. Optimality of equity issue strategies under costly and imperfect quality certification
5. Economics of costly and imperfect quality certification
6. Sequential equilibria
7. A note on ‘lemons’ markets with quality certification