A constitutional choice model of compensation for takings

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 1989, Pages 115-128

  Fischel, William A ^a   Shapiro, Perry ^b  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000517272     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0144-8188(89)90010-0     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Compensation for Takings An Economic Analysis
2. The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?
3. Unity in Tort Contract and Property The Model of Precaution
4. Implications of Property Rights for Government Investment Choices
5. Suburban Growth Controls An Economic and Legal Analysis
6. Takings: Descent and Resurrection
7. Takings Insurance and Michelman Comments on Economic Interpretations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law
8. An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions
9. The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse
10. Expropriation of Private Property and the Basis for Compensation
11. Property Utility and Fairness Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law
12. Takings 1987
13. The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication
14. Regulatory Takings in American Law and ‘Material Expropriation’ in Swiss Law-A Comparison of the Applicable Standards
15. The Elusive Median Voter
16. Against Ad-Hocery A Comment on Michelman
17. An Economic Insight on the Judicial Control of Planning Authorities' Discretion
18. The Theory of Economic Regulation
19. The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment