Bridging environmental and business ethics: A pragmatic framework

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 393-407

  Rosenthal, Sandra ^b   Buchholz, Rogene A ^a  

^a LOYOLA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000457744     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics19982046     Document Type: Review

References (46)

1. This meeting was held in Chicago, Illinois, in the spring of 1996 in conjunction with the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association.
2. Laura Westra and Patricia Werhane, eds., The Business of Consumption (Lanham, Md.: Roman and Littlefield, 1997). Our contribution to this volume, "Toward An Ethic of Consumption: Rethinking the Nature of Growth," provides an understanding of growth which is part and parcel of an environmental ethics.
3. There has been an effort to understand the environment as a stakeholder in the context of stakeholder theory, but this proposal is not undergirded by a developed philosophical framework for so doing. We are arguing elsewhere that pragmatism provides the framework for such an understanding. See Mark Starik, "Should Trees Have Managerial Standing? Toward Stakeholder Status for Non-Human Nature," Journal of Business Ethics 14 (1995): 207-08.
4. There have been recent efforts to relate feminist philosophy, or what is sometimes called the ethics of care, to business ethics. This approach focuses on traits of character that are valued in close relationships, traits such as sympathy, compassion, fidelity, friendship, and so forth. See Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
5. This phrase is borrowed from J. Baird Callicott, "The Case against Moral Pluralism," Environmental Ethics 12 (1990): 115. Although we borrow his phrase, the context of its use by him is not similar to the present context.
6. We have discussed this problem in some detail in "Beyond Moral Pluralism: A Pragmatic Perspective," Business Ethics Quarterly 6, no. 3 (July 1996): 263-75.
7. The growing recognition that moral pluralism as operative in business ethics points to a void in understanding the moral reasoning that governs choice among principles is well encapsulated in the following: "We have at this time no comprehensive moral theory capable of determining precisely when utilitarian considerations become 'sufficiently large' to outweigh narrow infringements on a conflicting right or standard of justice, or when considerations of justice become 'important enough' to outweigh infringements on conflicting rights. Moral philosophers have been unable to agree on any absolute rules for making such judgments. There are, however, a number of rough criteria that can guide us in these matters. . . . But these criteria remain rough and intuitive. They lie at the edges of the light that ethics can shed on moral reasoning." Manuel Velasquez, Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992), pp. 104-06. See also Tom Donaldson and Patricia Werhane, Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 17; Tom Beauchamp and Norm Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 43; and John Boatright, Ethics and the Conduct of Business (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 25.
8. The growing recognition that moral pluralism as operative in business ethics points to a void in understanding the moral reasoning that governs choice among principles is well encapsulated in the following: "We have at this time no comprehensive moral theory capable of determining precisely when utilitarian considerations become 'sufficiently large' to outweigh narrow infringements on a conflicting right or standard of justice, or when considerations of justice become 'important enough' to outweigh infringements on conflicting rights. Moral philosophers have been unable to agree on any absolute rules for making such judgments. There are, however, a number of rough criteria that can guide us in these matters. . . . But these criteria remain rough and intuitive. They lie at the edges of the light that ethics can shed on moral reasoning." Manuel Velasquez, Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992), pp. 104-06. See also Tom Donaldson and Patricia Werhane, Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 17; Tom Beauchamp and Norm Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 43; and John Boatright, Ethics and the Conduct of Business (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 25.
9. The growing recognition that moral pluralism as operative in business ethics points to a void in understanding the moral reasoning that governs choice among principles is well encapsulated in the following: "We have at this time no comprehensive moral theory capable of determining precisely when utilitarian considerations become 'sufficiently large' to outweigh narrow infringements on a conflicting right or standard of justice, or when considerations of justice become 'important enough' to outweigh infringements on conflicting rights. Moral philosophers have been unable to agree on any absolute rules for making such judgments. There are, however, a number of rough criteria that can guide us in these matters. . . . But these criteria remain rough and intuitive. They lie at the edges of the light that ethics can shed on moral reasoning." Manuel Velasquez, Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992), pp. 104-06. See also Tom Donaldson and Patricia Werhane, Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 17; Tom Beauchamp and Norm Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 43; and John Boatright, Ethics and the Conduct of Business (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 25.
10. The growing recognition that moral pluralism as operative in business ethics points to a void in understanding the moral reasoning that governs choice among principles is well encapsulated in the following: "We have at this time no comprehensive moral theory capable of determining precisely when utilitarian considerations become 'sufficiently large' to outweigh narrow infringements on a conflicting right or standard of justice, or when considerations of justice become 'important enough' to outweigh infringements on conflicting rights. Moral philosophers have been unable to agree on any absolute rules for making such judgments. There are, however, a number of rough criteria that can guide us in these matters. . . . But these criteria remain rough and intuitive. They lie at the edges of the light that ethics can shed on moral reasoning." Manuel Velasquez, Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992), pp. 104-06. See also Tom Donaldson and Patricia Werhane, Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 17; Tom Beauchamp and Norm Bowie, Ethical Theory and Business, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 43; and John Boatright, Ethics and the Conduct of Business (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 25.
11. Eugene C. Hargrove, "Preface," in Eugene C. Hargrove, ed., The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. xi. See also John N. Martin, "The Concept of the Irreplaceable," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 31-48; Eric Katz, "Utilitarianism and Preservation," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 357-64; Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future Generations," Environmental Ethics 4 (1982): 319-37; and Alastair S. Gunn, "Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 133-54.
12. Eugene C. Hargrove, "Preface," in Eugene C. Hargrove, ed., The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. xi. See also John N. Martin, "The Concept of the Irreplaceable," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 31-48; Eric Katz, "Utilitarianism and Preservation," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 357-64; Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future Generations," Environmental Ethics 4 (1982): 319-37; and Alastair S. Gunn, "Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 133-54.
13. Eugene C. Hargrove, "Preface," in Eugene C. Hargrove, ed., The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. xi. See also John N. Martin, "The Concept of the Irreplaceable," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 31-48; Eric Katz, "Utilitarianism and Preservation," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 357-64; Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future Generations," Environmental Ethics 4 (1982): 319-37; and Alastair S. Gunn, "Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 133-54.
14. Eugene C. Hargrove, "Preface," in Eugene C. Hargrove, ed., The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. xi. See also John N. Martin, "The Concept of the Irreplaceable," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 31-48; Eric Katz, "Utilitarianism and Preservation," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 357-64; Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future Generations," Environmental Ethics 4 (1982): 319-37; and Alastair S. Gunn, "Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 133-54.
15. Eugene C. Hargrove, "Preface," in Eugene C. Hargrove, ed., The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. xi. See also John N. Martin, "The Concept of the Irreplaceable," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 31-48; Eric Katz, "Utilitarianism and Preservation," Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 357-64; Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future Generations," Environmental Ethics 4 (1982): 319-37; and Alastair S. Gunn, "Traditional Ethics and the Moral Status of Animals," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 133-54.
16. See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review, 1975); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects (Los Altos, Calif.: William Kaufmann, 1974); and John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Duckworth, 1974).
17. See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review, 1975); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects (Los Altos, Calif.: William Kaufmann, 1974); and John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Duckworth, 1974).
18. See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review, 1975); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects (Los Altos, Calif.: William Kaufmann, 1974); and John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Duckworth, 1974).
19. See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review, 1975); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects (Los Altos, Calif.: William Kaufmann, 1974); and John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: Duckworth, 1974).
20. See Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Rights," in Hargrove, The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate, pp. 71-94.
21. For insights into the debate over rights, see Hargrove, The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate. A concise overview of the history of the rights debate can be found in the preface, pp. xii-xv.
22. Some philosophers have expressed concern that there is not enough tolerance in the environmental philosophy community for those who defend and work to develop positions for dealing with the environment which are anthropocentric and individualistic. This concern would seem to extend as well to a too-quick rejection of rights theories because they manifest these features. See Andrew Light and Eric Katz, "Introduction," in Andrew Light and Eric Katz, eds., Environmental Pragmatism (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 2-3; and Andrew Light, "Environmental Pragmatism as Philosophy or Metaphilosophy?" ibid., p. 327.
23. Some philosophers have expressed concern that there is not enough tolerance in the environmental philosophy community for those who defend and work to develop positions for dealing with the environment which are anthropocentric and individualistic. This concern would seem to extend as well to a too-quick rejection of rights theories because they manifest these features. See Andrew Light and Eric Katz, "Introduction," in Andrew Light and Eric Katz, eds., Environmental Pragmatism (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 2-3; and Andrew Light, "Environmental Pragmatism as Philosophy or Metaphilosophy?" ibid., p. 327.
24. By pragmatism in this essay, we mean classical American pragmatism, the movement incorporating the writings of its five major contributors: Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, G. H. Mead, and C. I. Lewis. That these philosophers provide a unified perspective is assumed in this essay, but this claim is defended in some length in Rosenthal's book, Speculative Pragmatism (Amtierst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986).
25. The small inroads which pragmatism is beginning to make into the field of business ethics has been by and large the results of our own recent efforts, which include numerous conference papers, articles, and two books: Business Ethics: The Pragmatic Path Beyond Principles to Process (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1998), and Rethinking Business Ethics: A Pragmatic Approach to be published by Oxford University Press as part of the Ruffin Series in Business Ethics.
26. The small inroads which pragmatism is beginning to make into the field of business ethics has been by and large the results of our own recent efforts, which include numerous conference papers, articles, and two books: Business Ethics: The Pragmatic Path Beyond Principles to Process (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1998), and Rethinking Business Ethics: A Pragmatic Approach to be published by Oxford University Press as part of the Ruffin Series in Business Ethics.
27. Pragmatism is already exerting its force in the field of environmental ethics as evidenced by the number of articles written from the pragmatic perspective which are appearing in environmental journals, as well as by the recent publication of Light and Katz, Environmental Pragmatism.
28. Thus, James' notion of the self, far from being a hindrance to an environment ethic, as claimed by Shaner and Duval, is an essential ingredient for it. See David E. Shaner and R. Shannon Duval, "Conservation Ethics and the Japanese Intellectual Tradition," Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 205-26.
29. Mead introduces the term generalized other, in Charles Morris, ed., Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
30. We have developed this view of the corporation as analogous to the self in "Theoretical Foundations of Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective," Business and Society 34, no. 3 (December 1995): 261-79.
31. For our own extended treatment of these issues in a different context, see our "How Pragmatism is an Environmental Ethic," in Light and Katz, Environmental Pragmatism, pp. 38-49.
32. This ideal receives its most intense form in Dewey's understanding of experiencing the world religiously within the context of naturalism as a way of relating one's self with the universe as the totality of conditions with which the self is connected. It should perhaps be pointed out here that this view is quite different from theistic beliefs, which often foster environmental indifference. John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 19. In "John Dewey and Environmental Thought: A Response to Chaloupka," Environmental Ethics 2 (1990): 243-60, Bob Pepperman Taylor's objections to Dewey as an environmentalist stem from an ongoing illicit abstraction both of the social, cultural, and biological dimensions of the human in Dewey's philosophy from concrete human existence, and of aesthetic sensibility from the very fiber of human life.
33. This ideal receives its most intense form in Dewey's understanding of experiencing the world religiously within the context of naturalism as a way of relating one's self with the universe as the totality of conditions with which the self is connected. It should perhaps be pointed out here that this view is quite different from theistic beliefs, which often foster environmental indifference. John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 19. In "John Dewey and Environmental Thought: A Response to Chaloupka," Environmental Ethics 2 (1990): 243-60, Bob Pepperman Taylor's objections to Dewey as an environmentalist stem from an ongoing illicit abstraction both of the social, cultural, and biological dimensions of the human in Dewey's philosophy from concrete human existence, and of aesthetic sensibility from the very fiber of human life.
34. The claim by Anthony Weston that pragmatism is a form of subjectivism is misplaced. See "Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 321.
35. William James, "On A Certain Blindness in Human Beings," in Frederick Burkhardt, ed., Talks to Teachers on Psychology: The Works of William James (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 149.
36. Thus, we find the characteristic of "harmless" in the above statement by James. Laura Westra, in An Environmental Proposal for Ethics (Lanham, Md.: Rowan and Littlefield, 1994), utilizes her original "principle of integrity" to present a view which eludes this kind of criticism, but in doing so distances her own "biological holism" from the more extreme forms of holism. Thus, she says of the absolute respect of all life, "I find the position hard to adopt, though easy to admire" (ibid., p. 125). Yet, the fact remains that she must work hard to distance herself from the standard positions that are subject to the standard attacks, and the pragmatic concept of community could perhaps serve her well in maintaining the balance she is working to achieve.
37. In "Environmental Value in Mead's Cosmology," Light and Katz, Environmental Pragmatism, p. 81, n. 6, Ari Santas points out that Mead denies rights to nonhuman animals because they have no self-consciousness, and holds that he should have followed James and adopted sentience as his criterion. Yet, on the other hand, Mead roots morality in the very rudiments of all organic behavior as selective and teleological, and also extends the dynamics of sociality to the universe at large. Thus, there is a strong general basis in his philosophy for extending the moral community based on the criterion of sentience at the least, and his understanding of the religious attitude as an expansion the social attitude or, in other terms, an expansion of the self to an inclusiveness beyond the ordinary boundaries of ethics is indicative of this general drive toward inclusiveness which pervades his philosophy. Nevertheless, in keeping with the pragmatic perspective, such a drive is not based on the extension of rights to nonhuman levels.
38. In "American Pragmatism Reconsidered: William James' Ecological Ethic," Environmental Ethics 4 (1992): 159-76, Robert Fuller argues for a possible panpsychism in James such that even inorganic matter has sentience and thus engage in valuing in at least some rudimentary fashion. We are disinclined to accept this interpretation of James or this kind of justification for concern with inorganic nature.
39. See the debate between Anthony Weston, "Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 321-39; and Eric Katz, "Searching for Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism and Despair," Environmental Ethics 9 (1987): 231-41. These papers are also reprinted in Light and Katz, Environmental Pragmatism.
40. See the debate between Anthony Weston, "Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 321-39; and Eric Katz, "Searching for Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism and Despair," Environmental Ethics 9 (1987): 231-41. These papers are also reprinted in Light and Katz, Environmental Pragmatism.
41. See the debate between Anthony Weston, "Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 321-39; and Eric Katz, "Searching for Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism and Despair," Environmental Ethics 9 (1987): 231-41. These papers are also reprinted in Light and Katz, Environmental Pragmatism.
42. Environmental holism need not have this problem, since most holists effectively count species as individuals. Thus, even though trees may have intrinsic value, one can justify cutting down particular tokens of the species for some reason consistent with some criteria for ecosystems, such as stability, integrity, etc. But, by locating intrinsic value in the species rather than the individual, the holist is faced with the problem of allowing for the moral worth of the individual.
43. Thus, for example, old growth forest is valuable in that it has the potential for yielding valuing experiences for individuals. But here problematic situations emerge, for the old growth forest, cut down for lumber, has the potential for yielding valuing experiences for humans as they desire more housing. The old growth forest, as a forest, has the potential for providing valuing experiences for individuals as they experience the joys of the outdoors. Further, in these and various other value dimensions of the old growth forest, its potential for the production of valuing experiences extends not just to actual valuings, or even to the valuings of actual individuals, but to its potential for the production of valuing experiences into an indefinite future. These potentialities for future valuing are not something that can be excluded from the present problematic context, for these potentialities to be affected are not in the future; they are there within the present context, to be affected by our present decisions.
44. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), p. 76.
45. Tom Colwell, in "The Ecological Perspective in John Dewey's Philosophy of Education," Educational Theory 35 (Summer 1985): 132-39, views Dewey's entire philosophy of education as a pioneering effort in ecological thought. See also the chapter on Dewey in Arthur Wirth's, Productive Work: In Industry and Schools (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), in which he analyzes the social and ecological backdrop of education.
46. Tom Colwell, in "The Ecological Perspective in John Dewey's Philosophy of Education," Educational Theory 35 (Summer 1985): 132-39, views Dewey's entire philosophy of education as a pioneering effort in ecological thought. See also the chapter on Dewey in Arthur Wirth's, Productive Work: In Industry and Schools (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983), in which he analyzes the social and ecological backdrop of education.