A Question for Egalitarians

Ethics

Volumn 107, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 658-669

  Kekes, John ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000383141     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233764     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 114th ed. (Washington, D.C., 1994), p. 87.
2. Richard J. Arneson, "Equality," in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 489-507, p. 489.
3. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 28.
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 100-101.
5. Thomas Nagel, "Equality," in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 106-27, pp. 117-18.
6. Rawls, p. 83.
7. Ibid., p. 101.
8. Ibid., p. 100.
9. There are some egalitarians who themselves reject what they call "the complete life view," which this proposal favors. See, e.g., Dennis McKerlie, "Equality and Time," Ethics 99 (1989): 475-91, "Equality between Age-Groups," Philosophy & Public Affairs 21 (1992): 275-95; and Larry S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 8. Their position is vulnerable to the preceding objection, which the view they reject was aimed to meet. In any case, they defend a version of egalitarianism different from the one that is being criticized in this article.
10. There are some egalitarians who themselves reject what they call "the complete life view," which this proposal favors. See, e.g., Dennis McKerlie, "Equality and Time," Ethics 99 (1989): 475-91, "Equality between Age-Groups," Philosophy & Public Affairs 21 (1992): 275-95; and Larry S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 8. Their position is vulnerable to the preceding objection, which the view they reject was aimed to meet. In any case, they defend a version of egalitarianism different from the one that is being criticized in this article.
11. There are some egalitarians who themselves reject what they call "the complete life view," which this proposal favors. See, e.g., Dennis McKerlie, "Equality and Time," Ethics 99 (1989): 475-91, "Equality between Age-Groups," Philosophy & Public Affairs 21 (1992): 275-95; and Larry S. Temkin, Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 8. Their position is vulnerable to the preceding objection, which the view they reject was aimed to meet. In any case, they defend a version of egalitarianism different from the one that is being criticized in this article.
12. Rawls, p. 92.
13. Ibid., p. 62.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 15, 102.
16. Nagel, Equality and Partiality, p. 28.
17. See, e.g., Harry G. Frankfurt, "Equality as a Moral Ideal," in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 9; and George Sher, Desert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).
18. See, e.g., Harry G. Frankfurt, "Equality as a Moral Ideal," in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 9; and George Sher, Desert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).
19. See, e.g., Harry G. Frankfurt, "Equality as a Moral Ideal," in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 9; and George Sher, Desert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).
20. See, e.g., Harry G. Frankfurt, "Equality as a Moral Ideal," in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 9; and George Sher, Desert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).