Decentralized Welfare: Will There Be Underprovision?

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 536-555

  Wheaton, William C ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000351334     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/juec.2000.2179     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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