An empirical examination of the relation between debt contracts and management incentives

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 229-259

  Begley, Joy ^a   Feltham, Gerald A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

C34; Debt covenants; G32; M49; Management incentives; Management power

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000327935     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(99)00006-3     Document Type: Article

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