Against the enclosure of the ethical commons: Radical environmentalism as an "ethics of place"

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 339-352

  Smith, Mick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ABERTAY DUNDEE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000312320     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics19971942     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Such spatial metaphors are increasingly popular in social theory. See, for example, Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), and for a selective but still useful overview Iiana Friedrich Silber, "Space, Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary Sociological Theory," Social Research 62, no. 2 (1995): 323-55. Unsurprisingly, spatial metaphors have been extensively developed by geographers. See, for example, Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1990), and Michael Keith and Steve Pile, eds., Place and the Politics of Identity (London: Routledge, 1993). For an extremely interesting attempt to develop a tradition of spatial thinking in regard to the environment, see David Macauley, "Out of Place and Outer Space: Hannah Arendt on Earth Alienation: A Historical and Critical Perspective," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 3, no. 4 (1992): 19-45.
2. Such spatial metaphors are increasingly popular in social theory. See, for example, Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), and for a selective but still useful overview Iiana Friedrich Silber, "Space, Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary Sociological Theory," Social Research 62, no. 2 (1995): 323-55. Unsurprisingly, spatial metaphors have been extensively developed by geographers. See, for example, Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1990), and Michael Keith and Steve Pile, eds., Place and the Politics of Identity (London: Routledge, 1993). For an extremely interesting attempt to develop a tradition of spatial thinking in regard to the environment, see David Macauley, "Out of Place and Outer Space: Hannah Arendt on Earth Alienation: A Historical and Critical Perspective," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 3, no. 4 (1992): 19-45.
3. Such spatial metaphors are increasingly popular in social theory. See, for example, Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), and for a selective but still useful overview Iiana Friedrich Silber, "Space, Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary Sociological Theory," Social Research 62, no. 2 (1995): 323-55. Unsurprisingly, spatial metaphors have been extensively developed by geographers. See, for example, Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1990), and Michael Keith and Steve Pile, eds., Place and the Politics of Identity (London: Routledge, 1993). For an extremely interesting attempt to develop a tradition of spatial thinking in regard to the environment, see David Macauley, "Out of Place and Outer Space: Hannah Arendt on Earth Alienation: A Historical and Critical Perspective," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 3, no. 4 (1992): 19-45.
4. Such spatial metaphors are increasingly popular in social theory. See, for example, Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), and for a selective but still useful overview Iiana Friedrich Silber, "Space, Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary Sociological Theory," Social Research 62, no. 2 (1995): 323-55. Unsurprisingly, spatial metaphors have been extensively developed by geographers. See, for example, Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1990), and Michael Keith and Steve Pile, eds., Place and the Politics of Identity (London: Routledge, 1993). For an extremely interesting attempt to develop a tradition of spatial thinking in regard to the environment, see David Macauley, "Out of Place and Outer Space: Hannah Arendt on Earth Alienation: A Historical and Critical Perspective," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 3, no. 4 (1992): 19-45.
5. Such spatial metaphors are increasingly popular in social theory. See, for example, Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), and for a selective but still useful overview Iiana Friedrich Silber, "Space, Fields, Boundaries: The Rise of Spatial Metaphors in Contemporary Sociological Theory," Social Research 62, no. 2 (1995): 323-55. Unsurprisingly, spatial metaphors have been extensively developed by geographers. See, for example, Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1990), and Michael Keith and Steve Pile, eds., Place and the Politics of Identity (London: Routledge, 1993). For an extremely interesting attempt to develop a tradition of spatial thinking in regard to the environment, see David Macauley, "Out of Place and Outer Space: Hannah Arendt on Earth Alienation: A Historical and Critical Perspective," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 3, no. 4 (1992): 19-45.
6. I do not use the term postmodern here to indicate either a form of late capitalism, e.g., Frederick Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991), or the presence of an epochal and universal break with what has gone before, e.g., Jim Cheney, "Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative," Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 293-325. Instead, it refers to the social and ethical spaces which, while conserving something of marginalized and suppressed trends within modernity (e.g., romanticism), also subvert, by their very diversity and uncontrollability, modernity's hegemonic and overarching principles.
7. I do not use the term postmodern here to indicate either a form of late capitalism, e.g., Frederick Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991), or the presence of an epochal and universal break with what has gone before, e.g., Jim Cheney, "Postmodern Environmental Ethics: Ethics as Bioregional Narrative," Environmental Ethics 11 (1989): 293-325. Instead, it refers to the social and ethical spaces which, while conserving something of marginalized and suppressed trends within modernity (e.g., romanticism), also subvert, by their very diversity and uncontrollability, modernity's hegemonic and overarching principles.
8. Ernest Bloch, The Principle of Hope (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
9. Carol Gilligan, "Reply to My Critics," in Mary Jeanne Larabee, ed., An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 208.
10. Gilligan's is not the only project seeking to radically deconstruct contemporary ethics and reconstitute a breathing space for women outside of its current confines, e.g., Luce Irigary's An Ethics of Sexual Difference (London: Athlone Press, 1993), regards a feminine ethic as flowing around "desire" rather than "care."
11. Carol Gilligan, "Reply to My Critics," p. 213.
12. Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 25. In a similar vein, Bourdieu, following Cassirer, suggests that we need to break with the substantialist mode of thinking which "inclines one to recognize no reality other than those that are available to direct intuition in ordinary experience." We must "apply to the social world the relational mode of thinking that is that of modern mathematics and physics, and which identifies the real not with substances but with relations." Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), p. 125.
13. Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 25. In a similar vein, Bourdieu, following Cassirer, suggests that we need to break with the substantialist mode of thinking which "inclines one to recognize no reality other than those that are available to direct intuition in ordinary experience." We must "apply to the social world the relational mode of thinking that is that of modern mathematics and physics, and which identifies the real not with substances but with relations." Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990), p. 125.
14. Freidrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense," in The Portable Nietzsche (London: Macmillan, 1966), p. 46.
15. Enclosures before the mid-eighteenth century tended to be carried out by private agreement.
16. W. E. Tate, The Enclosure Movement (New York: Walker and Co., 1967), states, "In the open field village as it existed towards the end of the Middle Ages, in some instances well into the eighteenth century . . . neither county justices nor central government normally had much concern with the everyday conduct of village affairs." See also J. A. Yelling, Common Field and Enclosure in England 1450-1850 (London: Macmillan, 1977).
17. W. E. Tate, The Enclosure Movement (New York: Walker and Co., 1967), states, "In the open field village as it existed towards the end of the Middle Ages, in some instances well into the eighteenth century . . . neither county justices nor central government normally had much concern with the everyday conduct of village affairs." See also J. A. Yelling, Common Field and Enclosure in England 1450-1850 (London: Macmillan, 1977).
18. David W. Petagorskey, Left Wing Democracy in the English Civil War (London: Gollancz, 1940), p. 183.
19. The term might also call to mind Heidegger's notion of "enframing" (Gestell). See Michel Haar, The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993).
20. Deferral might also bring to mind Derrida's use of the term differance as insinuating both a "spacing between" and a "postponing until later." Jaques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1978), p. 136.
21. I have no space here to review the extensive literature on rationalization. Readers should be aware of the outlines of Weber's and Heidegger's differing, though not incompatible, arguments on the ways in which instrumental reasoning imposes its own particular constraints on thought and action enframing and dominating the life-world according to principles of technical efficiency. These ideas were, of course, developed by the Frankfurt School. See Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), and Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (London: Routledge, 1993).
22. I have no space here to review the extensive literature on rationalization. Readers should be aware of the outlines of Weber's and Heidegger's differing, though not incompatible, arguments on the ways in which instrumental reasoning imposes its own particular constraints on thought and action enframing and dominating the life-world according to principles of technical efficiency. These ideas were, of course, developed by the Frankfurt School. See Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), and Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (London: Routledge, 1993).
23. Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 228.
24. The term interpellation is from Louis Althusser, Essays in Ideology (London: Verso, 1993).
25. Thus, despite its obsession with consequences, utilitarianism as a system is not Ideological, but rather is an expression of instrumental rationality. It envisages no end or limits to its applicability as a principle. As J. S. Mill remarked, "the corollaries from the principle of utility, like the precepts of every practical art, admit of indefinite improvement." John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarianism and Other Essays (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987), p. 296.
26. See Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings (London: Verso, 1995).
27. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Jeremy Waldron, Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 147.
28. Allen E. Buchanen, Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism (London: Methuen, 1982), p. 68.
29. Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," in Ernst Fischer, ed., Marx in His Own Words. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).
30. Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 135. Both defenders and critics of Marx alike have (ironically) tended to underestimate the possibilities for new post-revolutionary forms of moral discourse. Debates usually occur within a humanist problematic which focuses on whether or not Marxism actually presupposes implicit notions equivalent to those of individual rights and/or distributive justice. See Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) and the review of the book by Kate Soper, "Marxism and Morality," New Left Review 163 (1987): 101-13. See also Kai Neilson, "Does a Marxian Critical Theory of Society Need a Moral Theory?" Radical Philosophy 59 (1991): 21-26.
31. Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 135. Both defenders and critics of Marx alike have (ironically) tended to underestimate the possibilities for new post-revolutionary forms of moral discourse. Debates usually occur within a humanist problematic which focuses on whether or not Marxism actually presupposes implicit notions equivalent to those of individual rights and/or distributive justice. See Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) and the review of the book by Kate Soper, "Marxism and Morality," New Left Review 163 (1987): 101-13. See also Kai Neilson, "Does a Marxian Critical Theory of Society Need a Moral Theory?" Radical Philosophy 59 (1991): 21-26.
32. Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 135. Both defenders and critics of Marx alike have (ironically) tended to underestimate the possibilities for new post-revolutionary forms of moral discourse. Debates usually occur within a humanist problematic which focuses on whether or not Marxism actually presupposes implicit notions equivalent to those of individual rights and/or distributive justice. See Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) and the review of the book by Kate Soper, "Marxism and Morality," New Left Review 163 (1987): 101-13. See also Kai Neilson, "Does a Marxian Critical Theory of Society Need a Moral Theory?" Radical Philosophy 59 (1991): 21-26.
33. Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 135. Both defenders and critics of Marx alike have (ironically) tended to underestimate the possibilities for new post-revolutionary forms of moral discourse. Debates usually occur within a humanist problematic which focuses on whether or not Marxism actually presupposes implicit notions equivalent to those of individual rights and/or distributive justice. See Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) and the review of the book by Kate Soper, "Marxism and Morality," New Left Review 163 (1987): 101-13. See also Kai Neilson, "Does a Marxian Critical Theory of Society Need a Moral Theory?" Radical Philosophy 59 (1991): 21-26.
34. Michel Foucault, "On Popular Justice: A Discourse with Moaists," Power/Knowledge (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980), p. 1.
35. For further discussion of this point, see Mick Smith, "A Green Thought in a Green Shade: A Critique of the Rationalisation of Environmental Values," in Yvonne Guerrier, Nicholas Alexander, Jonathan Chase and Martin O'Brien, eds., Values and the Environment: A Social Science Perspective (Chichester: Wiley, 1995).
36. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialisation of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986), p. 36.
37. Marc Auge, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity (London: Verso, 1995).
38. Le Corbusier, The City of Tomorrow (London: Architectural Press, 1971).
39. The road movie often makes much of the liberty to be found in constant movement but even here the road eventually runs out. (Think of the film "Thelma and Louise.")
40. The term habitus refers to the individual's "unconscious" ability to act within the expected bounds of a socially given field, to bodily incorporate ideologically: transmitted open-ended strategies rather than follow explicit rules. See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
41. George Monbiot, "Defiant Culture," The Guardian, 7 December 1994.
42. Perhaps the highlight of this protest was the intervention of 100 local schoolchildren, who charged through security guards lines to successfully halt tree felling. "Children's Crusade Invades M77 Site," The Herald, 15 February 1995, p. 1.
43. Of course, there are large numbers of people involved on the fringes of such protests whose "form of life" might not seem radically different to the social norm. The protests are frequently marked by the great variety of individuals from very different backgrounds who give transient support to the protest. These people often become politicized and ethicized by their experiences. This tendency is typified in The Guardian, 1 March 1996, report of the locals' comments on attempts to evict the Newbury protesters.
44. Thus, for example, contemporary moral philosophy equates "deep ecology" with biospheric egalitarianism. Deep ecologists are then ridiculed and attacked for granting formal equality to insects and humans. They make no attempt to actually look and see what meaning equality has for environmentalists in practice. This problem is compounded by a number of philosophers, such as Lawrence Johnson and Paul Taylor, who while regarding themselves as radical environmentalists continue to work unquestioningly within the rubrics provided by modernity. Lawrence E. Johnson, A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
45. Thus, for example, contemporary moral philosophy equates "deep ecology" with biospheric egalitarianism. Deep ecologists are then ridiculed and attacked for granting formal equality to insects and humans. They make no attempt to actually look and see what meaning equality has for environmentalists in practice. This problem is compounded by a number of philosophers, such as Lawrence Johnson and Paul Taylor, who while regarding themselves as radical environmentalists continue to work unquestioningly within the rubrics provided by modernity. Lawrence E. Johnson, A Morally Deep World: An Essay on Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
46. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), para. 66.
47. Arne Naess, "Self-Realisation in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep and Wolves," Inquiry 22 (1979): 231-41. Naess remarks that "it is fairly unimportant whether the term 'rights (of animals)' is or is not used in the fight for human peaceful coexistence with a rich fauna." While the point of my paper is that it is actually very important whether or not environmental ethics are construed in these terms, Naess's remark at least makes clear that his argument is not tied to a formal biospheric egalitarianism.