Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 108, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 377-405

  Lewinsohn Zamir, Daphna ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0000296056     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/797478     Document Type: Review

References (155)

1. This assumption will not always be true. Sometimes public goods may be turned into private ones and supplied by the market. For instance, an entrepreneur may construct a road or a park. He may exclude free riders and recoup his expenses by fencing, installing toll booths, and charging entrance fees. It is commonly accepted, however, that the market cannot supply the entire demand for all public goods. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986). Therefore, nonmarket decisions regarding the choice and appropriate quantity of public goods are unavoidable.
2. A leading article making this claim is Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977). Subsequent contributions include Amitai Etzioni, The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception, 2 ECON. & PHIL. 159 (1986); and Howard Margolis, A New Model of Rational Choice, 91 ETHICS 265 (1981).
3. A leading article making this claim is Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977). Subsequent contributions include Amitai Etzioni, The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception, 2 ECON. & PHIL. 159 (1986); and Howard Margolis, A New Model of Rational Choice, 91 ETHICS 265 (1981).
4. A leading article making this claim is Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977). Subsequent contributions include Amitai Etzioni, The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception, 2 ECON. & PHIL. 159 (1986); and Howard Margolis, A New Model of Rational Choice, 91 ETHICS 265 (1981).
5. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 144-47, 158-59, 203-10 (1993); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7-14 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 242-43 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 923-25 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms].
6. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 144-47, 158-59, 203-10 (1993); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7-14 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 242-43 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 923-25 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms].
7. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 144-47, 158-59, 203-10 (1993); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7-14 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 242-43 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 923-25 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms].
8. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 144-47, 158-59, 203-10 (1993); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7-14 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 242-43 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 923-25 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms].
9. See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 185, 194-99 (1984);
10. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 242-43.
11. The consumer/citizen distinction is only one problem faced by policymakers wishing to consider or satisfy preferences. For example, preferences can be a function of the initial allocation of legal entitlements (the "endowment effect") and may adapt to what is perceived by people as available (the "sour grapes" phenomenon). In both cases, the result may be a strong bias in favor of the status quo See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983); Tyler Cowen The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty, 9 ECON. & PHIL. 253 (1993); Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 221-42; Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980). Such problems have important implications for social regulation. Nevertheless, consideration of people's preferences is essential in a liberal democracy. Thus, if people indeed manifest conflicting preferences in different social roles, the choice between consumer and citizen preferences merits close examination.
12. The consumer/citizen distinction is only one problem faced by policymakers wishing to consider or satisfy preferences. For example, preferences can be a function of the initial allocation of legal entitlements (the "endowment effect") and may adapt to what is perceived by people as available (the "sour grapes" phenomenon). In both cases, the result may be a strong bias in favor of the status quo See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983); Tyler Cowen The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty, 9 ECON. & PHIL. 253 (1993); Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 221-42; Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980). Such problems have important implications for social regulation. Nevertheless, consideration of people's preferences is essential in a liberal democracy. Thus, if people indeed manifest conflicting preferences in different social roles, the choice between consumer and citizen preferences merits close examination.
13. The consumer/citizen distinction is only one problem faced by policymakers wishing to consider or satisfy preferences. For example, preferences can be a function of the initial allocation of legal entitlements (the "endowment effect") and may adapt to what is perceived by people as available (the "sour grapes" phenomenon). In both cases, the result may be a strong bias in favor of the status quo See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983); Tyler Cowen The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty, 9 ECON. & PHIL. 253 (1993); Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 221-42; Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980). Such problems have important implications for social regulation. Nevertheless, consideration of people's preferences is essential in a liberal democracy. Thus, if people indeed manifest conflicting preferences in different social roles, the choice between consumer and citizen preferences merits close examination.
14. The consumer/citizen distinction is only one problem faced by policymakers wishing to consider or satisfy preferences. For example, preferences can be a function of the initial allocation of legal entitlements (the "endowment effect") and may adapt to what is perceived by people as available (the "sour grapes" phenomenon). In both cases, the result may be a strong bias in favor of the status quo See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983); Tyler Cowen The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty, 9 ECON. & PHIL. 253 (1993); Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 221-42; Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980). Such problems have important implications for social regulation. Nevertheless, consideration of people's preferences is essential in a liberal democracy. Thus, if people indeed manifest conflicting preferences in different social roles, the choice between consumer and citizen preferences merits close examination.
15. A notable example is GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 3-23 (1996).
16. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 2, at 326; John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 315 (1955); Etzioni, supra note 2; Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 75, 87-91 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986) James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, in RATIONAL CHOICE 142, 161 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); Margolis, supra note 2. For a general appraisal and critique of the multiple utility theories, see Timothy J. Brennan, A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks, 5 ECON. & PHIL. 189 (1989).
17. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 2, at 326; John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 315 (1955); Etzioni, supra note 2; Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 75, 87-91 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986) James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, in RATIONAL CHOICE 142, 161 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); Margolis, supra note 2. For a general appraisal and critique of the multiple utility theories, see Timothy J. Brennan, A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks, 5 ECON. & PHIL. 189 (1989).
18. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 2, at 326; John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 315 (1955); Etzioni, supra note 2; Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 75, 87-91 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986) James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, in RATIONAL CHOICE 142, 161 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); Margolis, supra note 2. For a general appraisal and critique of the multiple utility theories, see Timothy J. Brennan, A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks, 5 ECON. & PHIL. 189 (1989).
19. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 2, at 326; John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 315 (1955); Etzioni, supra note 2; Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 75, 87-91 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986) James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, in RATIONAL CHOICE 142, 161 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); Margolis, supra note 2. For a general appraisal and critique of the multiple utility theories, see Timothy J. Brennan, A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks, 5 ECON. & PHIL. 189 (1989).
20. Two examples are Amartya Sen's and John Harsanyi's positions. Sen distinguishes between a choice that maximizes an individual's personal welfare, which may include consideration of other people's well-being as long as their welfare affects her own, and a choice that gives a preference to an alternative that results in a lower level of personal welfare for the actor. The former is labeled "sympathy" and the latter "commitment." See Sen, supra note 2, at 326. Commitment involves counter-preferential choice and may be caused by factors like altruism, education, or social responsibility. Consequently, an individual may choose to forgo her subjective preference and behave in accordance with other people's preferences or the best interests of the community as a whole. Sen does not imply, however, that preferences based on commitment are in any sense "better" than those based on personal-welfare maximization. See id. at 326-29. He suggests a technique of meta-ranking (or rankings of preference rankings) to capture the process of choice between the different orderings and admits that such meta-ranking may result in an incomplete ordering of all possible alternatives. See id. at 337-38; cf. Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 7, at 60, 74-77 (discussing an application of his theory to collective action problems). Harsanyi distinguishes between "personal" or "subjective" preferences, which convey one's own personal point of view, and "ethical" or "moral" preferences, which reflect impersonal and impartial considerations of what is good from a social point of view. Like Sen, Harsanyi does not think that personal/subjective preferences are necessarily egoistic or should rank lower than ethical/moral ones. See Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 315; John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 47-48 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). On the subject of "second order preferences," or preferences over preferences, see Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971), which argues that second order preferences are a distinguishing characteristic of human beings.
21. Two examples are Amartya Sen's and John Harsanyi's positions. Sen distinguishes between a choice that maximizes an individual's personal welfare, which may include consideration of other people's well-being as long as their welfare affects her own, and a choice that gives a preference to an alternative that results in a lower level of personal welfare for the actor. The former is labeled "sympathy" and the latter "commitment." See Sen, supra note 2, at 326. Commitment involves counter-preferential choice and may be caused by factors like altruism, education, or social responsibility. Consequently, an individual may choose to forgo her subjective preference and behave in accordance with other people's preferences or the best interests of the community as a whole. Sen does not imply, however, that preferences based on commitment are in any sense "better" than those based on personal-welfare maximization. See id. at 326-29. He suggests a technique of meta-ranking (or rankings of preference rankings) to capture the process of choice between the different orderings and admits that such meta-ranking may result in an incomplete ordering of all possible alternatives. See id. at 337-38; cf. Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 7, at 60, 74-77 (discussing an application of his theory to collective action problems). Harsanyi distinguishes between "personal" or "subjective" preferences, which convey one's own personal point of view, and "ethical" or "moral" preferences, which reflect impersonal and impartial considerations of what is good from a social point of view. Like Sen, Harsanyi does not think that personal/subjective preferences are necessarily egoistic or should rank lower than ethical/moral ones. See Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 315; John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 47-48 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). On the subject of "second order preferences," or preferences over preferences, see Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971), which argues that second order preferences are a distinguishing characteristic of human beings.
22. Two examples are Amartya Sen's and John Harsanyi's positions. Sen distinguishes between a choice that maximizes an individual's personal welfare, which may include consideration of other people's well-being as long as their welfare affects her own, and a choice that gives a preference to an alternative that results in a lower level of personal welfare for the actor. The former is labeled "sympathy" and the latter "commitment." See Sen, supra note 2, at 326. Commitment involves counter-preferential choice and may be caused by factors like altruism, education, or social responsibility. Consequently, an individual may choose to forgo her subjective preference and behave in accordance with other people's preferences or the best interests of the community as a whole. Sen does not imply, however, that preferences based on commitment are in any sense "better" than those based on personal-welfare maximization. See id. at 326-29. He suggests a technique of meta-ranking (or rankings of preference rankings) to capture the process of choice between the different orderings and admits that such meta-ranking may result in an incomplete ordering of all possible alternatives. See id. at 337-38; cf. Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 7, at 60, 74-77 (discussing an application of his theory to collective action problems). Harsanyi distinguishes between "personal" or "subjective" preferences, which convey one's own personal point of view, and "ethical" or "moral" preferences, which reflect impersonal and impartial considerations of what is good from a social point of view. Like Sen, Harsanyi does not think that personal/subjective preferences are necessarily egoistic or should rank lower than ethical/moral ones. See Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 315; John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 47-48 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). On the subject of "second order preferences," or preferences over preferences, see Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971), which argues that second order preferences are a distinguishing characteristic of human beings.
23. Throughout the Essay, I shall assume that regulators must decide which form of actual preferences - consumer or citizen - should be chosen as an input for policy-making. It should be noted, however, that although commonly used in theory and practice, actual preferences are not the only plausible criteria for measuring people's well-being. Two other candidates are "hypothetical preferences" and "objective list" theories. A hypothetical preferences theory (also called "ideal preferences," "informed desire," or "true preferences") does not focus on the preferences a person actually has but rather on those she would have had if she possessed all the relevant information and had the emotional and intellectual capabilities to conduct an accurate examination of all alternatives and their possible consequences. See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 11-17 (1986); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 38 (1998); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 109-13 (Hackett 1981) (1907); Harsanyi, supra note 8, at 55-56. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361-62, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), in which he argues that a fully informed citizenry would reject the death penalty, uses similar hypothetical reasoning. An objective list theory focuses on how to maximize people's access to and use of certain good things. This theory presents some list of things that people should have, regardless of whether these same people actually desire them. See GRIFFIN, supra, at 40-55; KAGAN, supra, at 39-40; DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493 app. I at 499-501 (1984); Thomas Scanlon, Value, Desire, and Quality of Life, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 185, 186-91 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). The consumer/citizen debate is hardly relevant in the context of an objective list theory, as this theory is not tied to preferences, actual or hypothetical. Inasmuch as hypothetical preferences depart from the subjective desires and capabilities of individuals, they are significantly distinct from the preferences of real human beings. In the extreme, it may be argued that the hypothetical preferences theory is not a theory of preferences at all. However, to the extent that hypothetical preferences are taken to be similar to actual preferences and can thus assume either a consumer or citizen character, the debate is relevant to these preferences as well.
24. Throughout the Essay, I shall assume that regulators must decide which form of actual preferences - consumer or citizen - should be chosen as an input for policy-making. It should be noted, however, that although commonly used in theory and practice, actual preferences are not the only plausible criteria for measuring people's well-being. Two other candidates are "hypothetical preferences" and "objective list" theories. A hypothetical preferences theory (also called "ideal preferences," "informed desire," or "true preferences") does not focus on the preferences a person actually has but rather on those she would have had if she possessed all the relevant information and had the emotional and intellectual capabilities to conduct an accurate examination of all alternatives and their possible consequences. See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 11-17 (1986); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 38 (1998); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 109-13 (Hackett 1981) (1907); Harsanyi, supra note 8, at 55-56. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361-62, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), in which he argues that a fully informed citizenry would reject the death penalty, uses similar hypothetical reasoning. An objective list theory focuses on how to maximize people's access to and use of certain good things. This theory presents some list of things that people should have, regardless of whether these same people actually desire them. See GRIFFIN, supra, at 40-55; KAGAN, supra, at 39-40; DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493 app. I at 499-501 (1984); Thomas Scanlon, Value, Desire, and Quality of Life, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 185, 186-91 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). The consumer/citizen debate is hardly relevant in the context of an objective list theory, as this theory is not tied to preferences, actual or hypothetical. Inasmuch as hypothetical preferences depart from the subjective desires and capabilities of individuals, they are significantly distinct from the preferences of real human beings. In the extreme, it may be argued that the hypothetical preferences theory is not a theory of preferences at all. However, to the extent that hypothetical preferences are taken to be similar to actual preferences and can thus assume either a consumer or citizen character, the debate is relevant to these preferences as well.
25. Throughout the Essay, I shall assume that regulators must decide which form of actual preferences - consumer or citizen - should be chosen as an input for policy-making. It should be noted, however, that although commonly used in theory and practice, actual preferences are not the only plausible criteria for measuring people's well-being. Two other candidates are "hypothetical preferences" and "objective list" theories. A hypothetical preferences theory (also called "ideal preferences," "informed desire," or "true preferences") does not focus on the preferences a person actually has but rather on those she would have had if she possessed all the relevant information and had the emotional and intellectual capabilities to conduct an accurate examination of all alternatives and their possible consequences. See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 11-17 (1986); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 38 (1998); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 109-13 (Hackett 1981) (1907); Harsanyi, supra note 8, at 55-56. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361-62, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), in which he argues that a fully informed citizenry would reject the death penalty, uses similar hypothetical reasoning. An objective list theory focuses on how to maximize people's access to and use of certain good things. This theory presents some list of things that people should have, regardless of whether these same people actually desire them. See GRIFFIN, supra, at 40-55; KAGAN, supra, at 39-40; DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493 app. I at 499-501 (1984); Thomas Scanlon, Value, Desire, and Quality of Life, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 185, 186-91 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). The consumer/citizen debate is hardly relevant in the context of an objective list theory, as this theory is not tied to preferences, actual or hypothetical. Inasmuch as hypothetical preferences depart from the subjective desires and capabilities of individuals, they are significantly distinct from the preferences of real human beings. In the extreme, it may be argued that the hypothetical preferences theory is not a theory of preferences at all. However, to the extent that hypothetical preferences are taken to be similar to actual preferences and can thus assume either a consumer or citizen character, the debate is relevant to these preferences as well.
26. Throughout the Essay, I shall assume that regulators must decide which form of actual preferences - consumer or citizen - should be chosen as an input for policy-making. It should be noted, however, that although commonly used in theory and practice, actual preferences are not the only plausible criteria for measuring people's well-being. Two other candidates are "hypothetical preferences" and "objective list" theories. A hypothetical preferences theory (also called "ideal preferences," "informed desire," or "true preferences") does not focus on the preferences a person actually has but rather on those she would have had if she possessed all the relevant information and had the emotional and intellectual capabilities to conduct an accurate examination of all alternatives and their possible consequences. See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 11-17 (1986); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 38 (1998); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 109-13 (Hackett 1981) (1907); Harsanyi, supra note 8, at 55-56. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361-62, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), in which he argues that a fully informed citizenry would reject the death penalty, uses similar hypothetical reasoning. An objective list theory focuses on how to maximize people's access to and use of certain good things. This theory presents some list of things that people should have, regardless of whether these same people actually desire them. See GRIFFIN, supra, at 40-55; KAGAN, supra, at 39-40; DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493 app. I at 499-501 (1984); Thomas Scanlon, Value, Desire, and Quality of Life, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 185, 186-91 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). The consumer/citizen debate is hardly relevant in the context of an objective list theory, as this theory is not tied to preferences, actual or hypothetical. Inasmuch as hypothetical preferences depart from the subjective desires and capabilities of individuals, they are significantly distinct from the preferences of real human beings. In the extreme, it may be argued that the hypothetical preferences theory is not a theory of preferences at all. However, to the extent that hypothetical preferences are taken to be similar to actual preferences and can thus assume either a consumer or citizen character, the debate is relevant to these preferences as well.
27. Throughout the Essay, I shall assume that regulators must decide which form of actual preferences - consumer or citizen - should be chosen as an input for policy-making. It should be noted, however, that although commonly used in theory and practice, actual preferences are not the only plausible criteria for measuring people's well-being. Two other candidates are "hypothetical preferences" and "objective list" theories. A hypothetical preferences theory (also called "ideal preferences," "informed desire," or "true preferences") does not focus on the preferences a person actually has but rather on those she would have had if she possessed all the relevant information and had the emotional and intellectual capabilities to conduct an accurate examination of all alternatives and their possible consequences. See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 11-17 (1986); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 38 (1998); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 109-13 (Hackett 1981) (1907); Harsanyi, supra note 8, at 55-56. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361-62, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), in which he argues that a fully informed citizenry would reject the death penalty, uses similar hypothetical reasoning. An objective list theory focuses on how to maximize people's access to and use of certain good things. This theory presents some list of things that people should have, regardless of whether these same people actually desire them. See GRIFFIN, supra, at 40-55; KAGAN, supra, at 39-40; DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493 app. I at 499-501 (1984); Thomas Scanlon, Value, Desire, and Quality of Life, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 185, 186-91 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). The consumer/citizen debate is hardly relevant in the context of an objective list theory, as this theory is not tied to preferences, actual or hypothetical. Inasmuch as hypothetical preferences depart from the subjective desires and capabilities of individuals, they are significantly distinct from the preferences of real human beings. In the extreme, it may be argued that the hypothetical preferences theory is not a theory of preferences at all. However, to the extent that hypothetical preferences are taken to be similar to actual preferences and can thus assume either a consumer or citizen character, the debate is relevant to these preferences as well.
28. Hardin points out the enormous divergence between the number of Americans who profess their concern for environmental issues (over 100 million) and the number of Americans who actually contribute to environmental organizations (about one million). Even the one percent contributing spend very low sums to further their desired goals - around $10 per person, per year on average. The divergence with respect to other honored causes - such as civil rights, women's movements, and gun control - is even more dramatic. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 11, 105-07 (1982).
29. See SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7, 50-53; Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1403 (1981); Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 242-43. Another example given in support of the claim that the political process evokes behavior that is not aimed at maximizing self interest is the phenomenon of voting. People must realize that in large elections no single vote is likely to alter the outcome. Since the act of voting involves some costs (such as time and transportation costs), it is seemingly irrational to vote. Nevertheless, the turnout in elections is usually high. Therefore, political participation in elections is not guided by the desire to maximize private gains but by a desire "to do the right thing," to fulfill a civic duty, etc. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 47-71 (1994); IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION 45-49 (1987); Goodin, supra note 7, at 89-90; Sen, supra note 2, at 332-33.
30. See SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7, 50-53; Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1403 (1981); Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 242-43. Another example given in support of the claim that the political process evokes behavior that is not aimed at maximizing self interest is the phenomenon of voting. People must realize that in large elections no single vote is likely to alter the outcome. Since the act of voting involves some costs (such as time and transportation costs), it is seemingly irrational to vote. Nevertheless, the turnout in elections is usually high. Therefore, political participation in elections is not guided by the desire to maximize private gains but by a desire "to do the right thing," to fulfill a civic duty, etc. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 47-71 (1994); IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION 45-49 (1987); Goodin, supra note 7, at 89-90; Sen, supra note 2, at 332-33.
31. See SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7, 50-53; Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1403 (1981); Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 242-43. Another example given in support of the claim that the political process evokes behavior that is not aimed at maximizing self interest is the phenomenon of voting. People must realize that in large elections no single vote is likely to alter the outcome. Since the act of voting involves some costs (such as time and transportation costs), it is seemingly irrational to vote. Nevertheless, the turnout in elections is usually high. Therefore, political participation in elections is not guided by the desire to maximize private gains but by a desire "to do the right thing," to fulfill a civic duty, etc. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 47-71 (1994); IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION 45-49 (1987); Goodin, supra note 7, at 89-90; Sen, supra note 2, at 332-33.
32. See SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7, 50-53; Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1403 (1981); Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 242-43. Another example given in support of the claim that the political process evokes behavior that is not aimed at maximizing self interest is the phenomenon of voting. People must realize that in large elections no single vote is likely to alter the outcome. Since the act of voting involves some costs (such as time and transportation costs), it is seemingly irrational to vote. Nevertheless, the turnout in elections is usually high. Therefore, political participation in elections is not guided by the desire to maximize private gains but by a desire "to do the right thing," to fulfill a civic duty, etc. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 47-71 (1994); IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION 45-49 (1987); Goodin, supra note 7, at 89-90; Sen, supra note 2, at 332-33.
33. See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 141-47, 158-63, 190-216; SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7-14; Etzioni, supra note 2, at 164-65, 176; Goodin, supra note 7, at 86-91; Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1987, at 80, 85-86, 88-90, 93-94; Margolis, supra note 2, at 266, 277-79; Sagoff, supra note 11, at 1394-95, 1402-03, 1410-12; Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 243-47, 254; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140-45 (1986); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 924, 960. It should be noted that Sunstein's view of the consumer/citizen distinction is less extreme. He is careful not to label either type of preferences as "true" and not to draw a sharp line between the egoism of the private market and the benevolence of the political process. Sunstein tends to agree, however, that the disparities between consumer and citizen behavior support the use of citizen preferences in matters of social regulation. See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 247; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 960.
34. See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 141-47, 158-63, 190-216; SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7-14; Etzioni, supra note 2, at 164-65, 176; Goodin, supra note 7, at 86-91; Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1987, at 80, 85-86, 88-90, 93-94; Margolis, supra note 2, at 266, 277-79; Sagoff, supra note 11, at 1394-95, 1402-03, 1410-12; Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 243-47, 254; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140-45 (1986); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 924, 960. It should be noted that Sunstein's view of the consumer/citizen distinction is less extreme. He is careful not to label either type of preferences as "true" and not to draw a sharp line between the egoism of the private market and the benevolence of the political process. Sunstein tends to agree, however, that the disparities between consumer and citizen behavior support the use of citizen preferences in matters of social regulation. See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 247; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 960.
35. See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 141-47, 158-63, 190-216; SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7-14; Etzioni, supra note 2, at 164-65, 176; Goodin, supra note 7, at 86-91; Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1987, at 80, 85-86, 88-90, 93-94; Margolis, supra note 2, at 266, 277-79; Sagoff, supra note 11, at 1394-95, 1402-03, 1410-12; Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 243-47, 254; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140-45 (1986); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 924, 960. It should be noted that Sunstein's view of the consumer/citizen distinction is less extreme. He is careful not to label either type of preferences as "true" and not to draw a sharp line between the egoism of the private market and the benevolence of the political process. Sunstein tends to agree, however, that the disparities between consumer and citizen behavior support the use of citizen preferences in matters of social regulation. See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 247; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 960.
36. See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 141-47, 158-63, 190-216; SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7-14; Etzioni, supra note 2, at 164-65, 176; Goodin, supra note 7, at 86-91; Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1987, at 80, 85-86, 88-90, 93-94; Margolis, supra note 2, at 266, 277-79; Sagoff, supra note 11, at 1394-95, 1402-03, 1410-12; Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 243-47, 254; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140-45 (1986); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 924, 960. It should be noted that Sunstein's view of the consumer/citizen distinction is less extreme. He is careful not to label either type of preferences as "true" and not to draw a sharp line between the egoism of the private market and the benevolence of the political process. Sunstein tends to agree, however, that the disparities between consumer and citizen behavior support the use of citizen preferences in matters of social regulation. See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 247; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 960.
37. See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 141-47, 158-63, 190-216; SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7-14; Etzioni, supra note 2, at 164-65, 176; Goodin, supra note 7, at 86-91; Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1987, at 80, 85-86, 88-90, 93-94; Margolis, supra note 2, at 266, 277-79; Sagoff, supra note 11, at 1394-95, 1402-03, 1410-12; Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 243-47, 254; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140-45 (1986); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 924, 960. It should be noted that Sunstein's view of the consumer/citizen distinction is less extreme. He is careful not to label either type of preferences as "true" and not to draw a sharp line between the egoism of the private market and the benevolence of the political process. Sunstein tends to agree, however, that the disparities between consumer and citizen behavior support the use of citizen preferences in matters of social regulation. See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 247; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 960.
38. See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 141-47, 158-63, 190-216; SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 7-14; Etzioni, supra note 2, at 164-65, 176; Goodin, supra note 7, at 86-91; Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1987, at 80, 85-86, 88-90, 93-94; Margolis, supra note 2, at 266, 277-79; Sagoff, supra note 11, at 1394-95, 1402-03, 1410-12; Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 243-47, 254; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140-45 (1986); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 924, 960. It should be noted that Sunstein's view of the consumer/citizen distinction is less extreme. He is careful not to label either type of preferences as "true" and not to draw a sharp line between the egoism of the private market and the benevolence of the political process. Sunstein tends to agree, however, that the disparities between consumer and citizen behavior support the use of citizen preferences in matters of social regulation. See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 247; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 960.
39. See, e.g., ROBERT SUGDEN & ALAN WILLIAMS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 89-91 (1978); DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 259-75 (2d ed., 1992). "Willingness To Pay" (WTP) is most commonly used to estimate the gains of any project. Significantly different estimations result from the use of another criterion - "Willingness To Accept" (WTA). This represents the sum of money potential losers will require as compensation for putting up with the project. People usually demand much higher sums for agreeing to a project they oppose than they would be willing to pay for one they wish to endorse. See ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 30-38 (1989); Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1994). For the purposes of this study, however, there is no need to distinguish between the two criteria. Like WTP, WTA evaluates goods in monetary terms and focuses on their instrumental value in advancing people's welfare. Therefore, the two criteria are subject to many of the same criticisms.
40. See, e.g., ROBERT SUGDEN & ALAN WILLIAMS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 89-91 (1978); DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 259-75 (2d ed., 1992). "Willingness To Pay" (WTP) is most commonly used to estimate the gains of any project. Significantly different estimations result from the use of another criterion - "Willingness To Accept" (WTA). This represents the sum of money potential losers will require as compensation for putting up with the project. People usually demand much higher sums for agreeing to a project they oppose than they would be willing to pay for one they wish to endorse. See ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 30-38 (1989); Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1994). For the purposes of this study, however, there is no need to distinguish between the two criteria. Like WTP, WTA evaluates goods in monetary terms and focuses on their instrumental value in advancing people's welfare. Therefore, the two criteria are subject to many of the same criticisms.
41. See, e.g., ROBERT SUGDEN & ALAN WILLIAMS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 89-91 (1978); DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 259-75 (2d ed., 1992). "Willingness To Pay" (WTP) is most commonly used to estimate the gains of any project. Significantly different estimations result from the use of another criterion - "Willingness To Accept" (WTA). This represents the sum of money potential losers will require as compensation for putting up with the project. People usually demand much higher sums for agreeing to a project they oppose than they would be willing to pay for one they wish to endorse. See ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 30-38 (1989); Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1994). For the purposes of this study, however, there is no need to distinguish between the two criteria. Like WTP, WTA evaluates goods in monetary terms and focuses on their instrumental value in advancing people's welfare. Therefore, the two criteria are subject to many of the same criticisms.
42. See, e.g., ROBERT SUGDEN & ALAN WILLIAMS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 89-91 (1978); DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 259-75 (2d ed., 1992). "Willingness To Pay" (WTP) is most commonly used to estimate the gains of any project. Significantly different estimations result from the use of another criterion - "Willingness To Accept" (WTA). This represents the sum of money potential losers will require as compensation for putting up with the project. People usually demand much higher sums for agreeing to a project they oppose than they would be willing to pay for one they wish to endorse. See ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 30-38 (1989); Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1994). For the purposes of this study, however, there is no need to distinguish between the two criteria. Like WTP, WTA evaluates goods in monetary terms and focuses on their instrumental value in advancing people's welfare. Therefore, the two criteria are subject to many of the same criticisms.
43. According to this critique, cost-benefit analysis is a theoretically and inherently deficient tool with regard to social policy. This claim is more radical than the more common one, which focuses on the severe difficulties encountered in making an accurate estimate of costs and benefits or on the manipulability of the results of such an analysis.
44. The most forceful and elaborate presentations of this argument are found in the writings of Elizabeth Anderson and Mark Sagoff. See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 190-95, 203-16; SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 26-29, 40-42, 50-57, 68-72, 92-97; Sagoff, supra note 11, at 1410-18. For additional arguments against "scientific" reasoning and commensurability, and in defense of decision-making that utilizes emotions and imagination, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); and Martha C. Nussbaum, The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 54 (1990).
45. The most forceful and elaborate presentations of this argument are found in the writings of Elizabeth Anderson and Mark Sagoff. See ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 190-95, 203-16; SAGOFF, supra note 3, at 26-29, 40-42, 50-57, 68-72, 92-97; Sagoff, supra note 11, at 1410-18. For additional arguments against "scientific" reasoning and commensurability, and in defense of decision-making that utilizes emotions and imagination, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); and Martha C. Nussbaum, The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality, in LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 54 (1990).
46. On various models of the political process, see generally Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note 7, at 103.
47. The most forceful exposition of this argument is Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1635-39 (1989). For others, see Bruce Chapman, Rational Environmental Choice: Lessons for Economics from Law and Ethics, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 63, 65-66 (1993); Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1028-31, 1039-40 (1989); and Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 342-44 [hereinafter Farber, Arrow 's Theorem].
48. The most forceful exposition of this argument is Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1635-39 (1989). For others, see Bruce Chapman, Rational Environmental Choice: Lessons for Economics from Law and Ethics, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 63, 65-66 (1993); Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1028-31, 1039-40 (1989); and Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 342-44 [hereinafter Farber, Arrow 's Theorem].
49. The most forceful exposition of this argument is Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1635-39 (1989). For others, see Bruce Chapman, Rational Environmental Choice: Lessons for Economics from Law and Ethics, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 63, 65-66 (1993); Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1028-31, 1039-40 (1989); and Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 342-44 [hereinafter Farber, Arrow 's Theorem].
50. The most forceful exposition of this argument is Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1635-39 (1989). For others, see Bruce Chapman, Rational Environmental Choice: Lessons for Economics from Law and Ethics, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 63, 65-66 (1993); Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public Interest, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1028-31, 1039-40 (1989); and Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 342-44 [hereinafter Farber, Arrow 's Theorem].
51. See Rose, supra note 16, at 1633-35.
52. See BECKER, supra note 6, at 4, 139; see also WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 5-7, 16 (1974) (setting forth criteria for the analysis of environmental problems that do not exclude private altruism).
53. See Amartya Sen, Foundations of Social Choice Theory: An Epilogue, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note 7, at 213, 233-35. For a similar argument, see Chapman, supra note 16, at 64.
54. Existence value represents the value a person attributes to a good's enjoyment by other people and future generations and to the intrinsic worth of certain goods. This concept was developed and is mainly used in relation to environmental protection and wildlife preservation. See MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 13, at 63-67; John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781 (1967); Alan Randall, Human Preferences, Economics, and the Preservation of Species, in THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES 79, 84-85 (Bryan G. Norton ed., 1986). This relatively new concept supplements other "use-oriented" methods of estimating the value of unmarketed goods; examples of these latter methods are comparing the prices of houses that enjoy beautiful views or clean air to those of houses that do not, or examining the costs people incur in traveling to national parks. See THOMAS M. POWER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING: THE ECONOMIC PURSUIT OF QUALITY 71-74, 96-104 (2d ed. 1996); SUGDEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 148-167. The criticism of economic tools, discussed in supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text, is more applicable to these "use-oriented" methods of valuation.
55. Existence value represents the value a person attributes to a good's enjoyment by other people and future generations and to the intrinsic worth of certain goods. This concept was developed and is mainly used in relation to environmental protection and wildlife preservation. See MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 13, at 63-67; John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781 (1967); Alan Randall, Human Preferences, Economics, and the Preservation of Species, in THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES 79, 84-85 (Bryan G. Norton ed., 1986). This relatively new concept supplements other "use-oriented" methods of estimating the value of unmarketed goods; examples of these latter methods are comparing the prices of houses that enjoy beautiful views or clean air to those of houses that do not, or examining the costs people incur in traveling to national parks. See THOMAS M. POWER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING: THE ECONOMIC PURSUIT OF QUALITY 71-74, 96-104 (2d ed. 1996); SUGDEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 148-167. The criticism of economic tools, discussed in supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text, is more applicable to these "use-oriented" methods of valuation.
56. Existence value represents the value a person attributes to a good's enjoyment by other people and future generations and to the intrinsic worth of certain goods. This concept was developed and is mainly used in relation to environmental protection and wildlife preservation. See MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 13, at 63-67; John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781 (1967); Alan Randall, Human Preferences, Economics, and the Preservation of Species, in THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES 79, 84-85 (Bryan G. Norton ed., 1986). This relatively new concept supplements other "use-oriented" methods of estimating the value of unmarketed goods; examples of these latter methods are comparing the prices of houses that enjoy beautiful views or clean air to those of houses that do not, or examining the costs people incur in traveling to national parks. See THOMAS M. POWER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING: THE ECONOMIC PURSUIT OF QUALITY 71-74, 96-104 (2d ed. 1996); SUGDEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 148-167. The criticism of economic tools, discussed in supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text, is more applicable to these "use-oriented" methods of valuation.
57. It is true that existence value is estimated through the criterion of willingness to pay and is still a factor in the welfare functions of individuals. However, those who emphasize the intrinsic value of certain goods, such as the environment, do not usually claim that the effects of the goods on people are irrelevant or that the goods are important regardless of the existence of human beings or their consciousness of these goods. Indeed, they focus on the appropriate ways that people should value the goods. See Donald H. Regan, Duties of Preservation, in THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES, supra note 20, at 195, 196-203. Thus, the theoretical gap between the two views is narrower than it might seem at first glance. Whether existence value can be accurately measured by economic tools is a different question. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 141-44, 153-56 (1979); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991); Brennan, supra note 7, at 201; Russell Hardin, Autonomy, Identity, and Welfare, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 189, 190-91 (John Christman ed., 1989) ("[M]uch of actual economic reasoning is based on the assumption that actors are rational in the sense of being self-interested."); see also BECKER, supra note 6, at 151 (discussing the possibility that potential beneficiaries act as if they are altruistic out of self-interested motives); cf. Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 15-16 (1995) (criticizing the conventional economic view).
59. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 141-44, 153-56 (1979); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991); Brennan, supra note 7, at 201; Russell Hardin, Autonomy, Identity, and Welfare, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 189, 190-91 (John Christman ed., 1989) ("[M]uch of actual economic reasoning is based on the assumption that actors are rational in the sense of being self-interested."); see also BECKER, supra note 6, at 151 (discussing the possibility that potential beneficiaries act as if they are altruistic out of self-interested motives); cf. Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 15-16 (1995) (criticizing the conventional economic view).
60. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 141-44, 153-56 (1979); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991); Brennan, supra note 7, at 201; Russell Hardin, Autonomy, Identity, and Welfare, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 189, 190-91 (John Christman ed., 1989) ("[M]uch of actual economic reasoning is based on the assumption that actors are rational in the sense of being self-interested."); see also BECKER, supra note 6, at 151 (discussing the possibility that potential beneficiaries act as if they are altruistic out of self-interested motives); cf. Amartya Sen, Rationality and Social Choice, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 15-16 (1995) (criticizing the conventional economic view).
61. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 141-44, 153-56 (1979); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991); Brennan, supra note 7, at 201; Russell Hardin, Autonomy, Identity, and Welfare, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 189, 190-91 (John Christman ed., 1989)
62. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 201; Etzioni, supra note 2, at 161-63, 171; see also Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 280 (1984) (noting that economic models of regulation generally assume that the publicly interested goals of individuals are "empirically uninteresting and dispensable").
63. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
64. See Farber, Arrow's Theorem, supra note 16, at 342; Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 281-82. In general, the TOC may be regarded as a specific manifestation of the PD model: Common resources are over-exploited by individuals due to their PD-type preference orderings. For the purposes of this Essay, however, the terms PD and TOC are interchangeable, since they employ the same game-theoretic model and involve the same ranking of preferences. For conventional analyses of public goods as an instance of a PD or TOC, see, for example, ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 112-14 (1980); GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 72-77; HARDIN, supra note 10, at 16-28; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, 9-15 (1989); EDNA ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 49-53 (1977); and Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-46 (1968).
65. See Farber, Arrow's Theorem, supra note 16, at 342; Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 281-82. In general, the TOC may be regarded as a specific manifestation of the PD model: Common resources are over-exploited by individuals due to their PD-type preference orderings. For the purposes of this Essay, however, the terms PD and TOC are interchangeable, since they employ the same game-theoretic model and involve the same ranking of preferences. For conventional analyses of public goods as an instance of a PD or TOC, see, for example, ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 112-14 (1980); GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 72-77; HARDIN, supra note 10, at 16-28; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, 9-15 (1989); EDNA ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 49-53 (1977); and Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-46 (1968).
66. See Farber, Arrow's Theorem, supra note 16, at 342; Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 281-82. In general, the TOC may be regarded as a specific manifestation of the PD model: Common resources are over-exploited by individuals due to their PD-type preference orderings. For the purposes of this Essay, however, the terms PD and TOC are interchangeable, since they employ the same game-theoretic model and involve the same ranking of preferences. For conventional analyses of public goods as an instance of a PD or TOC, see, for example, ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 112-14 (1980); GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 72-77; HARDIN, supra note 10, at 16-28; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, 9-15 (1989); EDNA ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 49-53 (1977); and Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-46 (1968).
67. See Farber, Arrow's Theorem, supra note 16, at 342; Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 281-82. In general, the TOC may be regarded as a specific manifestation of the PD model: Common resources are over-exploited by individuals due to their PD-type preference orderings. For the purposes of this Essay, however, the terms PD and TOC are interchangeable, since they employ the same game-theoretic model and involve the same ranking of preferences. For conventional analyses of public goods as an instance of a PD or TOC, see, for example, ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 112-14 (1980); GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 72-77; HARDIN, supra note 10, at 16-28; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, 9-15 (1989); EDNA ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 49-53 (1977); and Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-46 (1968).
68. See Farber, Arrow's Theorem, supra note 16, at 342; Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 281-82. In general, the TOC may be regarded as a specific manifestation of the PD model: Common resources are over-exploited by individuals due to their PD-type preference orderings. For the purposes of this Essay, however, the terms PD and TOC are interchangeable, since they employ the same game-theoretic model and involve the same ranking of preferences. For conventional analyses of public goods as an instance of a PD or TOC, see, for example, ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 112-14 (1980); GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 72-77; HARDIN, supra note 10, at 16-28; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, 9-15 (1989); EDNA ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 49-53 (1977); and Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-46 (1968).
69. Classical examples of pure public goods are national defense and lighthouses. See FELDMAN, supra note 25, at 106-07; MUELLER, supra note 25, at 10-11. But see FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES 7-9 (1994) (noting that some private provision of public goods, like lighthouses, does exist).
70. Anatol Rapoport, Prisoner's Dilemma - Recollections and Observations, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY? - AN INTRODUCTION AND SOURCEBOOK 71, 77 (Brian Barry & Russell Hardin eds., 1982).
71. The payoff matrix of a Prisoner's Dilemma Game is as follows (with the payoffs of Player One listed first and the parenthetical roman numerals indicating Player One's preference ordering): Player Two Contribute Do Not Contribute Player One Contribute (II) 4,4 (IV) 0,8 Do Not (I) 8,0 (III) 2,2 Contribute
72. See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-97 (1957); see also ANDREW M. COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 115-18, 201-09 (2d ed., Butterworth-Heinemann 1995) (explaining and providing examples of PD games and analogous multiperson social dilemmas); HARDIN, supra note 10, at 22-25 (explaining the genesis, function, and appeal of the PD game).
73. See R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-97 (1957); see also ANDREW M. COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 115-18, 201-09 (2d ed., Butterworth-Heinemann 1995) (explaining and providing examples of PD games and analogous multiperson social dilemmas); HARDIN, supra note 10, at 22-25 (explaining the genesis, function, and appeal of the PD game).
74. For further explanation and elaboration, see infra Section III.A.
75. See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 75-77; Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The "Conservation Game": The Possibility of Voluntary Cooperation in Preserving Buildings of Cultural Importance, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 733, 759-60 (1997).
76. For various examples of behavior incompatible with the assumption of narrow self-interest maximization, see AMITA, ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS, 51-66 (1988); HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 17-25 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 50-54 (1989); and on Elster Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990). See also Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism, and Difference Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984) (showing that altruism and egalitarianism play a significant role in individuals' choices); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 101 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (demonstrating the willingness of people to enforce fairness at some cost to themselves). For a survey of experiments questioning the validity of the free-riding assumption, see infra notes 54-66, 73-76 and accompanying text.
77. For various examples of behavior incompatible with the assumption of narrow self-interest maximization, see AMITA, ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS, 51-66 (1988); HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 17-25 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 50-54 (1989); and on Elster Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990). See also Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism, and Difference Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984) (showing that altruism and egalitarianism play a significant role in individuals' choices); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 101 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (demonstrating the willingness of people to enforce fairness at some cost to themselves). For a survey of experiments questioning the validity of the free-riding assumption, see infra notes 54-66, 73-76 and accompanying text.
78. For various examples of behavior incompatible with the assumption of narrow self-interest maximization, see AMITA, ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS, 51-66 (1988); HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 17-25 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 50-54 (1989); and on Elster Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990). See also Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism, and Difference Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984) (showing that altruism and egalitarianism play a significant role in individuals' choices); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 101 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (demonstrating the willingness of people to enforce fairness at some cost to themselves). For a survey of experiments questioning the validity of the free-riding assumption, see infra notes 54-66, 73-76 and accompanying text.
79. For various examples of behavior incompatible with the assumption of narrow self-interest maximization, see AMITA, ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS, 51-66 (1988); HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 17-25 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 50-54 (1989); and on Elster Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990). See also Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism, and Difference Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984) (showing that altruism and egalitarianism play a significant role in individuals' choices); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 101 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (demonstrating the willingness of people to enforce fairness at some cost to themselves). For a survey of experiments questioning the validity of the free-riding assumption, see infra notes 54-66, 73-76 and accompanying text.
80. For various examples of behavior incompatible with the assumption of narrow self-interest maximization, see AMITA, ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS, 51-66 (1988); HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 17-25 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 50-54 (1989); and on Elster Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990). See also Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism, and Difference Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984) (showing that altruism and egalitarianism play a significant role in individuals' choices); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 101 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (demonstrating the willingness of people to enforce fairness at some cost to themselves). For a survey of experiments questioning the validity of the free-riding assumption, see infra notes 54-66, 73-76 and accompanying text.
81. For various examples of behavior incompatible with the assumption of narrow self-interest maximization, see AMITA, ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS, 51-66 (1988); HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 17-25 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 50-54 (1989); and on Elster Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990). See also Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer, Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism, and Difference Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984) (showing that altruism and egalitarianism play a significant role in individuals' choices); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 101 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) (demonstrating the willingness of people to enforce fairness at some cost to themselves). For a survey of experiments questioning the validity of the free-riding assumption, see infra notes 54-66, 73-76 and accompanying text.
82. On the rarity of this phenomenon, see ROBERT SUGDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO WELFARE ECONOMICS 32 (1981); and Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 315-16 Empirical evidence supports the assumption that self-interested, personal preferences do not undergo radical changes in the political sphere. See, e.g., Donald Philip Green & Ann Elizabeth Gerken, Self-Interest and Public Opinion Toward Smoking Restrictions and Cigarette Taxes, 53 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1989) (showing that nonsmokers are far more supportive of tightening smoking restrictions and increasing cigarette taxes than smokers). In addition, psychological experiments have shown a direct correlation between individuals' values and their propensities to cooperate with others. People having cooperative social value orientations behave more cooperatively than individualists and competitively motivated persons. See Roderick M. Kramer et al., Social Values and Cooperative Response to a Simulated Resource Conservation Crisis, 54 J. PERSONALITY 576 (1986); Wim B.G. Liebrand & Godfried J. van Run, The Effects of Social Motives on Behavior in Social Dilemmas in Two Cultures, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 86 (1985); see also COLMAN, supra note 29, at 221-23 (reporting and summarizing the findings of the psychological experiments). In the same vein, a Dutch survey that measured people's willingness to cooperate in helping the government achieve environmental goals - e.g., recycling of chemical household waste and energy saving in the household - has found a high rate of consistency between reported motives, rankings of preferences and choices In particular, respondents' motives (values, norms, desires, and personal tastes) toward environmental issues constrain their preference rankings and their decisions about whether to cooperate. See Robert J. van der Veen, How Motives Speak to Preferences 13-32 (June 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). Thus, one may reasonably assume that a self-centered person is less likely to alter his behavior in political settings, and that a socially-oriented person is likely to cooperate in private settings as well.
83. On the rarity of this phenomenon, see ROBERT SUGDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO WELFARE ECONOMICS 32 (1981); and Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 315-16 Empirical evidence supports the assumption that self-interested, personal preferences do not undergo radical changes in the political sphere. See, e.g., Donald Philip Green & Ann Elizabeth Gerken, Self-Interest and Public Opinion Toward Smoking Restrictions and Cigarette Taxes, 53 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1989) (showing that nonsmokers are far more supportive of tightening smoking restrictions and increasing cigarette taxes than smokers). In addition, psychological experiments have shown a direct correlation between individuals' values and their propensities to cooperate with others. People having cooperative social value orientations behave more cooperatively than individualists and competitively motivated persons. See Roderick M. Kramer et al., Social Values and Cooperative Response to a Simulated Resource Conservation Crisis, 54 J. PERSONALITY 576 (1986); Wim B.G. Liebrand & Godfried J. van Run, The Effects of Social Motives on Behavior in Social Dilemmas in Two Cultures, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 86 (1985); see also COLMAN, supra note 29, at 221-23 (reporting and summarizing the findings of the psychological experiments). In the same vein, a Dutch survey that measured people's willingness to cooperate in helping the government achieve environmental goals - e.g., recycling of chemical household waste and energy saving in the household - has found a high rate of consistency between reported motives, rankings of preferences and choices In particular, respondents' motives (values, norms, desires, and personal tastes) toward environmental issues constrain their preference rankings and their decisions about whether to cooperate. See Robert J. van der Veen, How Motives Speak to Preferences 13-32 (June 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). Thus, one may reasonably assume that a self-centered person is less likely to alter his behavior in political settings, and that a socially-oriented person is likely to cooperate in private settings as well.
84. On the rarity of this phenomenon, see ROBERT SUGDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO WELFARE ECONOMICS 32 (1981); and Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 315-16 Empirical evidence supports the assumption that self-interested, personal preferences do not undergo radical changes in the political sphere. See, e.g., Donald Philip Green & Ann Elizabeth Gerken, Self-Interest and Public Opinion Toward Smoking Restrictions and Cigarette Taxes, 53 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1989) (showing that nonsmokers are far more supportive of tightening smoking restrictions and increasing cigarette taxes than smokers). In addition, psychological experiments have shown a direct correlation between individuals' values and their propensities to cooperate with others. People having cooperative social value orientations behave more cooperatively than individualists and competitively motivated persons. See Roderick M. Kramer et al., Social Values and Cooperative Response to a Simulated Resource Conservation Crisis, 54 J. PERSONALITY 576 (1986); Wim B.G. Liebrand & Godfried J. van Run, The Effects of Social Motives on Behavior in Social Dilemmas in Two Cultures, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 86 (1985); see also COLMAN, supra note 29, at 221-23 (reporting and summarizing the findings of the psychological experiments). In the same vein, a Dutch survey that measured people's willingness to cooperate in helping the government achieve environmental goals - e.g., recycling of chemical household waste and energy saving in the household - has found a high rate of consistency between reported motives, rankings of preferences and choices In particular, respondents' motives (values, norms, desires, and personal tastes) toward environmental issues constrain their preference rankings and their decisions about whether to cooperate. See Robert J. van der Veen, How Motives Speak to Preferences 13-32 (June 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). Thus, one may reasonably assume that a self-centered person is less likely to alter his behavior in political settings, and that a socially-oriented person is likely to cooperate in private settings as well.
85. On the rarity of this phenomenon, see ROBERT SUGDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO WELFARE ECONOMICS 32 (1981); and Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 315-16 Empirical evidence supports the assumption that self-interested, personal preferences do not undergo radical changes in the political sphere. See, e.g., Donald Philip Green & Ann Elizabeth Gerken, Self-Interest and Public Opinion Toward Smoking Restrictions and Cigarette Taxes, 53 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1989) (showing that nonsmokers are far more supportive of tightening smoking restrictions and increasing cigarette taxes than smokers). In addition, psychological experiments have shown a direct correlation between individuals' values and their propensities to cooperate with others. People having cooperative social value orientations behave more cooperatively than individualists and competitively motivated persons. See Roderick M. Kramer et al., Social Values and Cooperative Response to a Simulated Resource Conservation Crisis, 54 J. PERSONALITY 576 (1986); Wim B.G. Liebrand & Godfried J. van Run, The Effects of Social Motives on Behavior in Social Dilemmas in Two Cultures, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 86 (1985); see also COLMAN, supra note 29, at 221-23 (reporting and summarizing the findings of the psychological experiments). In the same vein, a Dutch survey that measured people's willingness to cooperate in helping the government achieve environmental goals - e.g., recycling of chemical household waste and energy saving in the household - has found a high rate of consistency between reported motives, rankings of preferences and choices In particular, respondents' motives (values, norms, desires, and personal tastes) toward environmental issues constrain their preference rankings and their decisions about whether to cooperate. See Robert J. van der Veen, How Motives Speak to Preferences 13-32 (June 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). Thus, one may reasonably assume that a self-centered person is less likely to alter his behavior in political settings, and that a socially-oriented person is likely to cooperate in private settings as well.
86. On the rarity of this phenomenon, see ROBERT SUGDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO WELFARE ECONOMICS 32 (1981); and Harsanyi, supra note 7, at 315-16 Empirical evidence supports the assumption that self-interested, personal preferences do not undergo radical changes in the political sphere. See, e.g., Donald Philip Green & Ann Elizabeth Gerken, Self-Interest and Public Opinion Toward Smoking Restrictions and Cigarette Taxes, 53 PUB. OPINION Q. 1 (1989) (showing that nonsmokers are far more supportive of tightening smoking restrictions and increasing cigarette taxes than smokers). In addition, psychological experiments have shown a direct correlation between individuals' values and their propensities to cooperate with others. People having cooperative social value orientations behave more cooperatively than individualists and competitively motivated persons. See Roderick M. Kramer et al., Social Values and Cooperative Response to a Simulated Resource Conservation Crisis, 54 J. PERSONALITY 576 (1986); Wim B.G. Liebrand & Godfried J. van Run, The Effects of Social Motives on Behavior in Social Dilemmas in Two Cultures, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 86 (1985); see also COLMAN, supra note 29, at 221-23 (reporting and summarizing the findings of the psychological experiments). In the same vein, a Dutch survey that measured people's willingness to cooperate in helping the government achieve environmental goals - e.g., recycling of chemical household waste and energy saving in the household - has found a high rate of consistency between reported motives, rankings of preferences and choices In particular, respondents' motives (values, norms, desires, and personal tastes) toward environmental issues constrain their preference rankings and their decisions about whether to cooperate. See Robert J. van der Veen, How Motives Speak to Preferences 13-32 (June 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). Thus, one may reasonably assume that a self-centered person is less likely to alter his behavior in political settings, and that a socially-oriented person is likely to cooperate in private settings as well.
87. See Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 4, at 194-99; Kalt & Zupan, supra note 23, at 281-82; Kelman, supra note 12, at 90; see also MUELLER, supra note 25, at 367 (summarizing Brennan and Buchanan's argument).
88. See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 242-43. On problems in the estimation of risks, see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
89. See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 242-43. On problems in the estimation of risks, see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
90. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY ET AL., PUBLIC OPINION ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 3, 12 (1980); John M. Gillroy & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Polls: Environmental Protection, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 270, 279 (1986); see also infra note 82 (describing a comparable phenomenon regarding people's stated willingness to pay in contingent valuation studies).
91. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY ET AL., PUBLIC OPINION ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 3, 12 (1980); John M. Gillroy & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Polls: Environmental Protection, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 270, 279 (1986); see also infra note 82 (describing a comparable phenomenon regarding people's stated willingness to pay in contingent valuation studies).
92. Indeed, these explanations may support a stronger claim that consumer preferences represent a more accurate and realistic expression of people's preferences. See, e.g., Brennan & Buchanan supra note 4, at 199. For forceful elaborations of the claim that preferences are context-dependent and that one cannot speak about "true" preferences, see Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3; and Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 960-61.
93. Indeed, these explanations may support a stronger claim that consumer preferences represent a more accurate and realistic expression of people's preferences. See, e.g., Brennan & Buchanan supra note 4, at 199. For forceful elaborations of the claim that preferences are context-dependent and that one cannot speak about "true" preferences, see Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3; and Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 960-61.
94. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
95. The "Assurance Problem" was introduced by Amartya Sen. See Amartya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount, 81 Q.J. ECON. 112, 114 (1967). For a discussion of public goods that focuses on the Assurance Game model, see Carlisle Ford Runge, Institutions and the Free Rider The Assurance Problem in Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154 (1984). Professor Runge's analysis differs from mine in several important respects. While I argue that a sense of hopelessness obstructs mutual cooperation in private settings, Runge argues that the problem lies in people's sense of fairness. Even if their own contribution may further the desired goal, they are unwilling to be the lone contributor because bearing such a burden alone seems unfair. See id. at 160-61. While I claim that in the context of public goods people naturally consider the interests of others, see infra Section III.B, Runge denies the presence of any altruistic motives. See Runge, supra, at 160-61. Furthermore, whereas my analysis focuses on a critique of the consumer/citizen distinction and is primarily directed at the evaluation and justification of governmental provision of public goods, Runge centers on the conditions under which public goods may be provided voluntarily. See id. at 155, 158, 171-72. I will discuss a "fairness" explanation in the context of the consumer/citizen distinction, see infra note 53, as well as the possibility of voluntary provision of public goods, see infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
96. The payoff matrix of an Assurance Game is as follows (with the payoffs of Player One listed first and the parenthetical roman numerals indicating Player One's preference ordering): Player Two Contribute Do Not Contribute Player One Contribute (I) 8,8 (IV) 0,2 Do Not (III) 2,0 (II) 4,4 Contribute The term "Assurance Game" is sometimes used to describe a slightly different preference ordering: (I) everyone contributes; (II) I do not contribute but others do; (III) no one contributes; (IV) I contribute, but others do not. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 22, at 20 (referring to the version of the Assurance Game not used in this Essay); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 38 (1987) (describing both versions). The difference between the two versions lies in the reversal of the second and third priorities. That variation reflects differences in the models' underlying assumptions: While the model I use assumes that mutual contribution is a precondition to achieving the desired goal, the other version assumes that a person can successfully free ride on the efforts of others (her second-ranking preference). Although both versions assume that people prefer mutual cooperation to free riding, and thus their normative implications largely converge, the version I employ better captures the hopelessness explanation that I describe in this Essay.
97. The ranking of Outcome III before Outcome IV should not be regarded as a manifestation of greed. In both situations, not enough people contribute, so some people's efforts are wasted. The magnitude of this waste may be the same. The AG player is not assumed to be a "saint." One may realistically presume that she favors a situation in which she does not belong to the group that toils in vain.
98. Sen, supra note 39, at 114, 122 (using the phrase in his analysis of people's decisions regarding optimum saving rates); see also TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 38-39 (applying AG analysis to the maintenance of dikes and ditches for irrigation or flood control by two cultivators, and to the weeding of a shared vegetable patch); Carlisle Ford Runge, Common Property Externalities: Isolai ion, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context, 63 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 595, 600-05 (1981) (examining overgrazing of a common range as an application of the AG model); Runge, supra note 39, at 155, 160-61 (discussing the development of institutions that coordinate expectations and facilitate voluntary provision of public goods). For further applications, see ELSTER, supra note 22, at 21-22; THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 83-93 (1960); and Edna Ullman-Margalit, Coordination Norms and Social Choice, 11 ERKENNTINIS 143, 145-50 (1977).
99. Sen, supra note 39, at 114, 122 (using the phrase in his analysis of people's decisions regarding optimum saving rates); see also TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 38-39 (applying AG analysis to the maintenance of dikes and ditches for irrigation or flood control by two cultivators, and to the weeding of a shared vegetable patch); Carlisle Ford Runge, Common Property Externalities: Isolai ion, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context, 63 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 595, 600-05 (1981) (examining overgrazing of a common range as an application of the AG model); Runge, supra note 39, at 155, 160-61 (discussing the development of institutions that coordinate expectations and facilitate voluntary provision of public goods). For further applications, see ELSTER, supra note 22, at 21-22; THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 83-93 (1960); and Edna Ullman-Margalit, Coordination Norms and Social Choice, 11 ERKENNTINIS 143, 145-50 (1977).
100. Sen, supra note 39, at 114, 122 (using the phrase in his analysis of people's decisions regarding optimum saving rates); see also TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 38-39 (applying AG analysis to the maintenance of dikes and ditches for irrigation or flood control by two cultivators, and to the weeding of a shared vegetable patch); Carlisle Ford Runge, Common Property Externalities: Isolai ion, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context, 63 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 595, 600-05 (1981) (examining overgrazing of a common range as an application of the AG model); Runge, supra note 39, at 155, 160-61 (discussing the development of institutions that coordinate expectations and facilitate voluntary provision of public goods). For further applications, see ELSTER, supra note 22, at 21-22; THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 83-93 (1960); and Edna Ullman-Margalit, Coordination Norms and Social Choice, 11 ERKENNTINIS 143, 145-50 (1977).
101. See SCHELLING, supra note 42, at 92-93, 96, 134-35; Runge, supra note 39, at 164; Ullman-Margalit, supra note 42, at 149-50.
102. See ELSTER, supra note 22, at 20-21. In some cases, the uncooperative outcome can be avoided if individual contributions are retrievable. In such circumstances, one does not stand to lose much from testing the possibility of cooperation, since there is no fear of being "stuck" with wasteful contributions. See Jean Hampton, Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods, 3 ECON. & PHIL. 245, 259-60, 263 (1987). In many other cases, however, contributors to the provision of public goods cannot retrieve their costs - e.g., a person who restrains her whaling operations without succeeding in avoiding whale extinction or who contributes money to the campaign of an unsuccessful candidate.
103. See supra notes 32-33, 36-37 and accompanying text.
104. Compare this preference ordering with that of a PD, in which the most preferred alternative is to free ride on the efforts of others. See supra text accompanying note 28.
105. Feelings of "hopelessness" can explain the choice of lower-ranked preferences in other game scenarios as well. In the Chicken Game (CG), the ordering of preferences is as follows: (I) I do not contribute, but enough others do; (II) we all contribute; (III) I contribute, although others do not; (IV) nobody contributes. Like the AG, the CG is more cooperative than the PD. In comparison to the PD, the third and fourth priorities are reversed: While a PD player prefers universal noncooperation to the "sucker's" lone contribution, a CG player prefers nonreciprocated contribution to nonprovision of the good. Yet, as with the PD, the literature focuses on the impact of greed on a CG. Much of the discussion is dedicated to the potential role greed plays in bringing about the least preferred result (Outcome IV); each CG player has an incentive to precommit herself (irrevocably, if possible) to noncooperation. By doing so she may force others into cooperation that will avoid the worst outcome and enable herself to realize the most preferred option (Outcome I). Mistakes regarding the probable choices of others, or mutual maintenance of previous commitments, may bring about the disastrous, least preferred option. See COLMAN, supra note 29, at 111-15; TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 39; Anatol Rapoport & Albert M. Chammah, The Game of Chicken, in GAME THEORY IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 151 (Ira R. Buchler & Hugo G. Nutini eds., 1969). I argue that a desire to free ride is only one possible explanation for an observed noncooperative outcome. Although a CG player prefers lone contribution (Outcome III) to universal noncooperation (Outcome IV). this contribution will depend on her estimation of the probability of independently providing the good. She will contribute only if her individual efforts (or the combined efforts of enough cooperative others) will suffice. If she estimates that, no matter what she does, cooperative efforts will not reach the minimum level needed to provide the good, then she will not waste her efforts on a hopeless project. See HARDIN, supra note 10, at 58-59. Thus, feelings of hopelessness may play an important role in CGs as well and cause people to behave in a way that realizes their least preferred outcome. Therefore, one should be cautious before deducing preferences from observed choices.
106. For a discussion of circumstances under which people's other-regarding preferences may be effectuated in the private sphere, see infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
107. Furthermore, people derive utility from the very act of voting. See GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 51. The relatively low cost of expressing preferences in political settings has important distributive implications: Poor people may lack sufficient resources even to attempt to realize their socially-oriented preferences in market settings. In contrast, their vote carries equal weight in the political arena. See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 246.
108. To be sure, this is a simplistic and stylized account of the political process. In reality, it may not be easy to realize desired goals in the political arena. For example, problems associated with majority voting, logrolling, and rent-seeking, or the fact that a person's preferred options may not appear on the agenda or only as a bundle with additional and less desired proposals cast doubt on the feasibility of accurately transforming citizen preferences into political outcomes. Nevertheless, it is still true that the perplexing feeling of hopelessness is significantly diminished in a political setting. Therefore, such a setting can genuinely reflect the preferences that people hold but do not always reveal in private settings.
109. See supra Subsection II.C.2.
110. For a discussion of the PD explanation, see supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
111. Besides hopelessness, people's notions of fairness can also explain why cooperation fails in AGs played in market settings. A person may rank other-regarding, collective goals highest (Outcome I in an AG) but condition her contribution on that of others. In the absence of similar contributions by other people, she may prefer not to contribute at all (Outcome II in an AG). Even if a person believes that her lone contribution can have a positive impact on a desired goal (e.g., improving the condition of one homeless individual or saving one person from starvation), she may still believe that it is unfair for her to carry the burden alone. Consequently, if people do not trust others to do their fair share in the private sphere, only the second-best outcome will be realized. In contrast the highest-ranking preferences can be attained in the public sphere, since there is a guarantee that if the favored policy is adopted by the government or other regulatory agencies, individuals will be required to share the financial burden among them. Cf. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 3, at 245-46 (mentioning motives of fairness, shame, and victimization in the context of a "solution of prisoners' dilemmas").
112. The experiment described in the text below were structured as PD situations, so they do not directly test the AG hypothesis. They show, however, that people often choose to cooperate, even when they are able to free ride. These results support the plausibility of the AG model.
113. See Norbert L. Kerr, Illusions of Efficacy: The Effects of Group Size on Perceived Efficacy in Social Dilemmas, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 287 (1989) [hereinafter Kerr, Illusions]. Studies focusing on self-efficacy show that cooperation increases when people believe their own contribution will significantly affect the outcome. See COLMAN, supra note 29, at 217; Norbert L. Kerr, Efficacy as a Causal and Moderating Variable in Social Dilemmas, in SOCIAL DILEMMAS: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 59 (Wim B.G. Liebrand et al. eds., 1992); Norbert L. Kerr & Cynthia M. Kaufman-Gilliland, Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513 (1994). Such studies can also support the claim that individuals are encouraged to cooperate rather than to free ride when they feel they can personally influence the prospect of successful cooperation. Since individual contributions are inconsequential with respect to many public goods, however, one should concentrate on the effect of perceived collective efficacy.
114. See Norbert L. Kerr, Illusions of Efficacy: The Effects of Group Size on Perceived Efficacy in Social Dilemmas, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 287 (1989) [hereinafter Kerr, Illusions]. Studies focusing on self-efficacy show that cooperation increases when people believe their own contribution will significantly affect the outcome. See COLMAN, supra note 29, at 217; Norbert L. Kerr, Efficacy as a Causal and Moderating Variable in Social Dilemmas, in SOCIAL DILEMMAS: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 59 (Wim B.G. Liebrand et al. eds., 1992); Norbert L. Kerr & Cynthia M. Kaufman-Gilliland, Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513 (1994). Such studies can also support the claim that individuals are encouraged to cooperate rather than to free ride when they feel they can personally influence the prospect of successful cooperation. Since individual contributions are inconsequential with respect to many public goods, however, one should concentrate on the effect of perceived collective efficacy.
115. See Norbert L. Kerr, Illusions of Efficacy: The Effects of Group Size on Perceived Efficacy in Social Dilemmas, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 287 (1989) [hereinafter Kerr, Illusions]. Studies focusing on self-efficacy show that cooperation increases when people believe their own contribution will significantly affect the outcome. See COLMAN, supra note 29, at 217; Norbert L. Kerr, Efficacy as a Causal and Moderating Variable in Social Dilemmas, in SOCIAL DILEMMAS: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 59 (Wim B.G. Liebrand et al. eds., 1992); Norbert L. Kerr & Cynthia M. Kaufman-Gilliland, Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513 (1994). Such studies can also support the claim that individuals are encouraged to cooperate rather than to free ride when they feel they can personally influence the prospect of successful cooperation. Since individual contributions are inconsequential with respect to many public goods, however, one should concentrate on the effect of perceived collective efficacy.
116. See Kerr, Illusions, supra note 55, at 303-09.
117. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. One might even argue that the free riding assumption requires an opposite correlation between collective efficacy and cooperation. A free rider can reason that the higher the prospects of successful cooperation, the less his own contribution is needed to attain the desired goal. Since there is a greater chance of freely benefiting from the efforts of others, the rate of cooperation should decline when collective efficacy rises.
118. See, e.g., COLMAN, supra note 29, at 218-21; Linnda R. Caporael et al., Selfishness Examined: Cooperation in the Absence of Egoistic Incentives, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 683, 692-93, 696 (1989); Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, supra note 55, at 513-15; A.J.C. van de Kragt et al., Doing Well and Doing Good as Ways of Resolving Social Dilemmas, in EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL DILEMMAS 177, 197-99 (Henk A.M. Wilke et al. eds., 1986).
119. See, e.g., COLMAN, supra note 29, at 218-21; Linnda R. Caporael et al., Selfishness Examined: Cooperation in the Absence of Egoistic Incentives, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 683, 692-93, 696 (1989); Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, supra note 55, at 513-15; A.J.C. van de Kragt et al., Doing Well and Doing Good as Ways of Resolving Social Dilemmas, in EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL DILEMMAS 177, 197-99 (Henk A.M. Wilke et al. eds., 1986).
120. See Robyn M. Dawes et al., Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other People's Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3-5 (1977).
121. See id. at 5, 9.
122. See id. at 5-7, 10.
123. See COLMAN, supra note 29, at 219-21; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, supra note 55, at 514, 525-27; John M. Orbell et al., Explaining Discussion-Induced Cooperation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811, 812, 818 (1988).
124. See also Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, supra note 55, at 525 (providing additional reasons for concluding that the group identity hypothesis cannot persuasively explain the communication effect).
125. The absence of universal cooperation can also be explained within the AG framework: It is reasonable to assume that not everyone will be convinced by nonbinding promises of cooperation. Those having insufficient trust in others may opt for the maximin choice, which is noncooperation. For an explanation, see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. A different rationalization is that the uncooperative minority (or at least some subset of them) indeed prefers to free ride. The AG model, however, still applies to the large majority of participants.
126. See, e.g., Peter Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment, 3 EUR. ECON. REV. 111 (1972) (demonstrating that people do not always cheat or free-ride whenever they can benefit from it, even when the opportunity for strategic behavior is understood). For additional experiments questioning the generality and validity of the strong free-riding hypothesis, see Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods I: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem, 84 AM. J. SOC. 1335, 1349-50, 1356-59 (1979); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods II: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem, 85 AM. J. SOC. 926, 936-37 (1980); and Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods IV, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 307-08 (1981).
127. See, e.g., Peter Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment, 3 EUR. ECON. REV. 111 (1972) (demonstrating that people do not always cheat or free-ride whenever they can benefit from it, even when the opportunity for strategic behavior is understood). For additional experiments questioning the generality and validity of the strong free-riding hypothesis, see Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods I: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem, 84 AM. J. SOC. 1335, 1349-50, 1356-59 (1979); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods II: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem, 85 AM. J. SOC. 926, 936-37 (1980); and Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods IV, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 307-08 (1981).
128. See, e.g., Peter Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment, 3 EUR. ECON. REV. 111 (1972) (demonstrating that people do not always cheat or free-ride whenever they can benefit from it, even when the opportunity for strategic behavior is understood). For additional experiments questioning the generality and validity of the strong free-riding hypothesis, see Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods I: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem, 84 AM. J. SOC. 1335, 1349-50, 1356-59 (1979); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods II: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem, 85 AM. J. SOC. 926, 936-37 (1980); and Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods IV, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 307-08 (1981).
129. See, e.g., Peter Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment, 3 EUR. ECON. REV. 111 (1972) (demonstrating that people do not always cheat or free-ride whenever they can benefit from it, even when the opportunity for strategic behavior is understood). For additional experiments questioning the generality and validity of the strong free-riding hypothesis, see Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods I: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem, 84 AM. J. SOC. 1335, 1349-50, 1356-59 (1979); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods II: Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem, 85 AM. J. SOC. 926, 936-37 (1980); and Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods IV, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 295, 307-08 (1981).
130. In the supergame, the long-run gains from cooperation and the fear of retaliation may outweigh the short-run gains of defection (getting the most preferred outcome once, but receiving the third-best outcome thereafter). Even in the supergame, however, there is no guarantee that the desired outcome will be realized. The parties might find themselves locked in the noncooperative outcome. For discussions of the possibility of cooperation in repetitive plays of PD, see COLMAN, supra note 29, at 135-60; LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 29, at 97-102; MCLEAN, supra note 11, at 133-39; ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 107-11, 138-40 (1986); and TAYLOR, supra note 40, at 60-108.
131. See Sen, supra note 2, at 326, 330 (maintaining that commitment, as described supra note 8, is mostly irrelevant to choices of consumer goods).
132. See Kelman, supra note 12, at 93 (explaining that people "display their concerns for others" when "political decisions involve the community as a whole"); Sen, supra note 2, at 330-32 (questioning the assumption that with regard to public goods, as distinguished from private ones, the preferences people reveal aim at maximizing their personal gains); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 3, at 924-25, 960 (arguing that citizen choices are other-regarding because, unlike consumer choices, they directly affect the collectivity and therefore are governed by social norms that discourage and sanction selfishness).
133. See Ronald Dworkin, DeFunis v. Sweatt, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 63, 77-81 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1977). On the distinction between personal and external preferences and its policy implications, see BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 62-65, 71-72 (1965); Kurt Baier, Welfare and Preference, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY?, supra note 27, at 284, 289-91; Brian Barry, Lady Chatterley's Lover and Doctor Fischer's Bomb Party: Liberalism, Pareto Optimality, and the Problem of Objectionable Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note 7, at 11, 35-36, 41; Brennan, supra note 7, at 196, 202, 204; and Margolis, supra note 2, at 277-78. Cf. ELSTER, supra note 22, at 81-85 (discussing the legitimacy of manipulating people's preferences by coercion, seduction, and persuasion).
134. See Ronald Dworkin, DeFunis v. Sweatt, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 63, 77-81 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1977). On the distinction between personal and external preferences and its policy implications, see BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 62-65, 71-72 (1965); Kurt Baier, Welfare and Preference, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY?, supra note 27, at 284, 289-91; Brian Barry, Lady Chatterley's Lover and Doctor Fischer's Bomb Party: Liberalism, Pareto Optimality, and the Problem of Objectionable Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note 7, at 11, 35-36, 41; Brennan, supra note 7, at 196, 202, 204; and Margolis, supra note 2, at 277-78. Cf. ELSTER, supra note 22, at 81-85 (discussing the legitimacy of manipulating people's preferences by coercion, seduction, and persuasion).
135. See Ronald Dworkin, DeFunis v. Sweatt, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 63, 77-81 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1977). On the distinction between personal and external preferences and its policy implications, see BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 62-65, 71-72 (1965); Kurt Baier, Welfare and Preference, in RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY?, supra note 27, at 284, 289-91; Brian Barry, Lady Chatterley's Lover and Doctor Fischer's Bomb Party: Liberalism, Pareto Optimality, and the Problem of Objectionable Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, supra note 7, at 11, 35-36, 41; Brennan, supra note 7, at 196, 202, 204; and Margolis, supra note 2, at 277-78. Cf. ELSTER, supra note 22, at 81-85 (discussing the legitimacy of manipulating people's preferences by coercion, seduction, and persuasion).
136. Dworkin forcefully argues against consideration of people's external preferences, i.e., those concerning the "assignment of goods and opportunities to others." Dworkin, supra note 69, at 77. He claims that considering altruistic external preferences will result in "double counting" and thus will infringe upon the norm that people be treated equally. Id. at 78. This is because some people will benefit not only from the weight accorded to their own preferences but also from the weight accorded to altruistic preferences that others have concerning their well-being. Individuals holding opposing personal preferences may be unable or unwilling to develop countering external preferences to offset this influence. See id. at 78-79, 81. For criticisms of this claim, see Joseph Raz, Professor Dworkin's Theory of Rights, 26 POL. STUD. 123, 131-32 (1978). See also GRIFFIN, supra note 9, at 24-25 (rejecting the claim that other-regarding desires should not be considered). It should be noted that Dworkin's argument addressed problems in the utility calculus - i.e., the process of quantifying and aggregating individual preferences in order to maximize overall social utility. Inasmuch as the problem of "double counting" exists, it is particularly relevant to such a process and considerably less relevant to one that is based on more flexible, less technical deliberation and reasoning. In other words, Dworkin's criticism of external preferences supports a political process that accords much weight to the reasons for supporting various policies and the merits of different views. See infra Part IV. Furthermore, as explained in the text above, Dworkin's recommendation that external preferences be disregarded cannot be applied to public goods. The inherent collaborative character of these goods causes even strictly personal preferences - those regarding one's own enjoyment - to have significant external effects.
137. See Donald Philip Green, The Price Elasticity of Mass Preferences, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 128, 129, 132, 136-39 (1992) (employing data from both verbal expressions of willingness to pay and actual payments for goods); cf. Etzioni, supra note 2, at 173, 176, 178 (offering a similar, though nonempirical, argument).
138. There is a tension between this finding and the claims of proponents of the consumer/citizen distinction. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
139. See Donald Philip Green et al., How the Scope and Method of Public Funding Affect Willingness To Pay for Public Goods, 58 PUB. OPINION Q. 49, 64-65 (1994) (questioning subjects on their readiness to fund teaching English to immigrants and saving seabirds from oil spills).
140. See id. at 54-56, 59, 61-62.
141. If anything, these results suggest that the taxation mode inspired people to contribute more. There appeared to be no correlation, however, between the reminder and the type of payment vehicle. See id. at 58-60, 62.
142. See id. at 60-61, 64.
143. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 31.
144. See id. at 755-57, 763-66.
145. See id. at 783-87.
146. See Runge, supra note 39, at 155-58.
147. For arguments supporting the necessity of examining and evaluating the reasons for public policies, see Baier, supra note 69, at 291-94; Brennan, supra note 7, at 203-05; Elster, supra note 15, at 111; and Sagoff, supra note 11, at 1412.
148. The most severe estimation problems are posed by goods that have a large component of "existence" value, such as environmental and wildlife protection. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Such values cannot be captured by market-revealed evaluations, and so economists have turned to personal surveys. The questionnaire technique known as the contingent valuation method (CVM) tries to elicit people's responses regarding the additional costs they are willing to incur (in donations, higher taxes or bills, and the like) in order to assure some level of the public good. These estimates are then employed in a cost-benefit analysis. CVM's ability to estimate existence values accurately is debated among economists and psychologists. For example, some studies have shown that people's stated willingness to pay is implausibly large, given their support for other public goods and their budgetary constraints. See, e.g., Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4603-04 app. 1 (1993); MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 13, at 231-59, 295-306; William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 3; Peter A. Diamond et al., Does Contingent Valuation Measure Preferences? Experimental Evidence, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 41; Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994); Charles R. Plott, Contingent Valuation: A View of the Conference and Associated Research, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 467. Although it is difficult to elicit "consumer" preferences accurately through CVM surveys when existence values are involved, it is far from clear that abandoning any attempt at estimation will achieve better results. For example, in order to overcome the tendency to overestimate values in CVM surveys, it was suggested that respondents be explicitly reminded of substitute goods and budgetary constraints.
149. The most severe estimation problems are posed by goods that have a large component of "existence" value, such as environmental and wildlife protection. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Such values cannot be captured by market-revealed evaluations, and so economists have turned to personal surveys. The questionnaire technique known as the contingent valuation method (CVM) tries to elicit people's responses regarding the additional costs they are willing to incur (in donations, higher taxes or bills, and the like) in order to assure some level of the public good. These estimates are then employed in a cost-benefit analysis. CVM's ability to estimate existence values accurately is debated among economists and psychologists. For example, some studies have shown that people's stated willingness to pay is implausibly large, given their support for other public goods and their budgetary constraints. See, e.g., Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4603-04 app. 1 (1993); MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 13, at 231-59, 295-306; William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 3; Peter A. Diamond et al., Does Contingent Valuation Measure Preferences? Experimental Evidence, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 41; Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994); Charles R. Plott, Contingent Valuation: A View of the Conference and Associated Research, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 467. Although it is difficult to elicit "consumer" preferences accurately through CVM surveys when existence values are involved, it is far from clear that abandoning any attempt at estimation will achieve better results. For example, in order to overcome the tendency to overestimate values in CVM surveys, it was suggested that respondents be explicitly reminded of substitute goods and budgetary constraints.
150. The most severe estimation problems are posed by goods that have a large component of "existence" value, such as environmental and wildlife protection. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Such values cannot be captured by market-revealed evaluations, and so economists have turned to personal surveys. The questionnaire technique known as the contingent valuation method (CVM) tries to elicit people's responses regarding the additional costs they are willing to incur (in donations, higher taxes or bills, and the like) in order to assure some level of the public good. These estimates are then employed in a cost-benefit analysis. CVM's ability to estimate existence values accurately is debated among economists and psychologists. For example, some studies have shown that people's stated willingness to pay is implausibly large, given their support for other public goods and their budgetary constraints. See, e.g., Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4603-04 app. 1 (1993); MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 13, at 231-59, 295-306; William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 3; Peter A. Diamond et al., Does Contingent Valuation Measure Preferences? Experimental Evidence, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 41; Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994); Charles R. Plott, Contingent Valuation: A View of the Conference and Associated Research, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 467. Although it is difficult to elicit "consumer" preferences accurately through CVM surveys when existence values are involved, it is far from clear that abandoning any attempt at estimation will achieve better results. For example, in order to overcome the tendency to overestimate values in CVM surveys, it was suggested that respondents be explicitly reminded of substitute goods and budgetary constraints.
151. The most severe estimation problems are posed by goods that have a large component of "existence" value, such as environmental and wildlife protection. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Such values cannot be captured by market-revealed evaluations, and so economists have turned to personal surveys. The questionnaire technique known as the contingent valuation method (CVM) tries to elicit people's responses regarding the additional costs they are willing to incur (in donations, higher taxes or bills, and the like) in order to assure some level of the public good. These estimates are then employed in a cost-benefit analysis. CVM's ability to estimate existence values accurately is debated among economists and psychologists. For example, some studies have shown that people's stated willingness to pay is implausibly large, given their support for other public goods and their budgetary constraints. See, e.g., Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4603-04 app. 1 (1993); MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 13, at 231-59, 295-306; William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 3; Peter A. Diamond et al., Does Contingent Valuation Measure Preferences? Experimental Evidence, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 41; Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994); Charles R. Plott, Contingent Valuation: A View of the Conference and Associated Research, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 467. Although it is difficult to elicit "consumer" preferences accurately through CVM surveys when existence values are involved, it is far from clear that abandoning any attempt at estimation will achieve better results. For example, in order to overcome the tendency to overestimate values in CVM surveys, it was suggested that respondents be explicitly reminded of substitute goods and budgetary constraints.
152. The most severe estimation problems are posed by goods that have a large component of "existence" value, such as environmental and wildlife protection. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Such values cannot be captured by market-revealed evaluations, and so economists have turned to personal surveys. The questionnaire technique known as the contingent valuation method (CVM) tries to elicit people's responses regarding the additional costs they are willing to incur (in donations, higher taxes or bills, and the like) in order to assure some level of the public good. These estimates are then employed in a cost-benefit analysis. CVM's ability to estimate existence values accurately is debated among economists and psychologists. For example, some studies have shown that people's stated willingness to pay is implausibly large, given their support for other public goods and their budgetary constraints. See, e.g., Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4603-04 app. 1 (1993); MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 13, at 231-59, 295-306; William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 3; Peter A. Diamond et al., Does Contingent Valuation Measure Preferences? Experimental Evidence, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 41; Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994); Charles R. Plott, Contingent Valuation: A View of the Conference and Associated Research, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 467. Although it is difficult to elicit "consumer" preferences accurately through CVM surveys when existence values are involved, it is far from clear that abandoning any attempt at estimation will achieve better results. For example, in order to overcome the tendency to overestimate values in CVM surveys, it was suggested that respondents be explicitly reminded of substitute goods and budgetary constraints.
153. The most severe estimation problems are posed by goods that have a large component of "existence" value, such as environmental and wildlife protection. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Such values cannot be captured by market-revealed evaluations, and so economists have turned to personal surveys. The questionnaire technique known as the contingent valuation method (CVM) tries to elicit people's responses regarding the additional costs they are willing to incur (in donations, higher taxes or bills, and the like) in order to assure some level of the public good. These estimates are then employed in a cost-benefit analysis. CVM's ability to estimate existence values accurately is debated among economists and psychologists. For example, some studies have shown that people's stated willingness to pay is implausibly large, given their support for other public goods and their budgetary constraints. See, e.g., Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 4602, 4603-04 app. 1 (1993); MITCHELL & CARSON, supra note 13, at 231-59, 295-306; William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in CONTINGENT VALUATION 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 3; Peter A. Diamond et al., Does Contingent Valuation Measure Preferences? Experimental Evidence, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 41; Daniel Kahneman & Ilana Ritov, Determinants of Stated Willingness To Pay for Public Goods: A Study in the Headline Method, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994); Charles R. Plott, Contingent Valuation: A View of the Conference and Associated Research, in CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra, at 467. Although it is difficult to elicit "consumer" preferences accurately through CVM surveys when existence values are involved, it is far from clear that abandoning any attempt at estimation will achieve better results. For example, in order to overcome the tendency to overestimate values in CVM surveys, it was suggested that respondents be explicitly reminded of substitute goods and budgetary constraints.
154. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. at 4611 app. 4612-13. It may be argued that this fear is magnified in political settings that do not mention the issue of cost at all, such as elections and public opinion polls. Thus, although economic information should be gathered and utilized with caution and restraint, it seems unwise to disregard it. Consumerist estimations of people's valuation of public goods may be used as a kind of "check" on citizen preferences. It is worth noting that, in the final analysis, even scholars who severely criticize the use of economic quantification tools do not recommend that they be abandoned. Rather, they advocate recognizing the limits of quantification and abandoning the search for a single, "magic" figure or an accurate numerical point estimate. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2042-70 (1998) (criticizing the use of cost-benefit analysis in the field of risk regulation). In particular, see id. at 2042-43, 2054-56, 2068-69.
155. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. at 4611 app. 4612-13. It may be argued that this fear is magnified in political settings that do not mention the issue of cost at all, such as elections and public opinion polls. Thus, although economic information should be gathered and utilized with caution and restraint, it seems unwise to disregard it. Consumerist estimations of people's valuation of public goods may be used as a kind of "check" on citizen preferences. It is worth noting that, in the final analysis, even scholars who severely criticize the use of economic quantification tools do not recommend that they be abandoned. Rather, they advocate recognizing the limits of quantification and abandoning the search for a single, "magic" figure or an accurate numerical point estimate. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 2042-70 (1998) (criticizing the use of cost-benefit analysis in the field of risk regulation). In particular, see id. at 2042-43, 2054-56, 2068-69.