Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals' likelihood of avoiding detection

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 13, Issue 2, 1993, Pages 217-224

  Bebchuk, Lucian Arye ^a   Kaplow, Louis ^a  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000265608     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0144-8188(93)90007-R     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension
2. Crime and Punishment An Economic Approach
3. The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines tor Acts that Definitely Are Undesirable
4. Avoidance Screening and Optimum Enforcement
5. Monitoring vis-à-vis Investigation in Enforcement ot Law
6. A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat offenders
7. The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines
8. The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
9. A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals
10. Specific versus General Enforcement of Law
11. A Note Marginal Deterrence