A taxonomy of functions

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 493-514

  Walsh, Denis M ^a   Ariew, André ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000260470     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.1996.10717464     Document Type: Note

References (41)

1. We wish to thank the foUowing people for comments: Henry Byerly, Robert Cummins, Berent Enc, D.O. Kohn, Joel Pust, Larry Shapiro, Elliott Sober, Chris Stephens, and two anonymous referees. This work was funded in part by SSHRC Postdoctoral feUowship 756–94.-0750 to DMW.
2. Cummins, R., 1975. ‘Functional Analysis,’. Journal of Philosophy, 72: 741–65. Reprinted in E. Sober, Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1994). All quotations from this paper will be taken from the Sober reprint.
3. Kitcher, P., 1993. “ ‘Function and Design,’ in ”. In Midwest Studies in Philosophy XVIII Edited by: French, P. A., Uehling, T. E., and Wettstein, H. K., 379–97. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
4. Amundson, R., and Lauder, G., 1994. “ ‘Function without Purpose: The Uses of Causal Role Function in Evolutionary Biology,’ ”. In Biology and Philosophy 9 443–69. Godfrey-Smith, ‘Functions: Consensus Without Unity,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly74 (1993) 196–208
5. 1983. The Nature of Psychological Explanation Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. In, Cummins amends his account of function to allow that s and x may also range over processes themselves (e.g. multiplying 27 by 32) and their component processes (e.g. mutliplying 2 by 7, adding 5 and 1), irrespective of how these capacities are instantiated.
6. It will become apparent that there is some dispute over how to interpret the question of why a feature is present. Some (B. Enç, ‘Function Attributions and Functional Explanation,’ Philosophy of Science 46 [1979] 343–65; and we) believe that function ascription yields genuinely teleological explanations of the presence of a feature (i.e. it explains why a feature persists by citing its effects); others (K. Neander, ‘The Teleological Notion of “Function,”’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy69 [1991] 454–68; P. Kitcher, ‘Function and Design’; P. Godfrey-Smith, ‘A Modern History Theory of Functions,’ Nous28 [1994] 344–62; R.G. Millikan ‘In Defense of Proper Functions,’ Philosophy of Science56 [1994] 288–302) believe that function ascriptions merely explain the current presence of a trait by citing its causal history.
7. Wright, L., 1973. ‘Functions,’. Philosophical Review, 82: 139–68.
8. Mills, S., and Beatty, J., 1979. “ ‘The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness,’ ”. In Philosophy of Science 263–86. 46 see also Sober's Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology.
9. Millikan, R. G., 1984. Language, Thought, and other Biological Categories Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (and ‘In Defense of Proper Functions’; K. Neander, ‘Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense,’ Philosophy of Science58 (1991) 168–84 and “The Teleological Notion fo ‘”Function”’; P. Godfrey-Smith, ‘A Modern History Theory of Functions’
10. ‘x’ We shall use the following convention to distinguish trait types from tokens. Upper case italics ‘X’ are variables ranging over trait types; lower case italics are variables ranging over tokens, such that x is a token of X.
11. This is the reason for the ‘aetiological’ epithet.
12. Liem, K., “ ‘Evolutionary Strategies and Morphological Innovations: Cichlid Pharyngeal Jaws,’ ”. In Systematic Zoology 22 (1973) 425–41
13. We thank Farish A. Jenkins Jr. of the Museum of Comparative Zoology and Harvard Medical School for corroborating this.
14. Bigelow, J., and Pargetter, R., 1987. ‘Functions,’. Journal of Philosophy, 84: 181–97. See B. Enç and F. Adams, ‘Functions and Goal Directedness,’ Philosophy of Science591992 636–54; E. Sober, Philosophy of Biology (Boulder, CO: Westview 1993).
15. Mitchell, S., 1993. ‘Dispositions or Etiologies? A Comment on Bigelow and Pargetter,’. Journal of Philosophy, 90: 249–59. and ‘Function, Fitness, and Disposition,’ Biology and Philosophy101995 39–54; P. Godfrey-Smith, ‘A Modern History Theory of Functions’
16. Enç and Adams (‘Functions and Goal Directedness’) also point out that functional explanations may be either forward-looking or aetiological, pace Mitchell, who contends that aetiology is the only explanatory project for which functions are invoked.
17. This is something that advocates of the historical theory readily admit (see especially Mitchell, ‘Dispositions or Etiologies?’). They tend to deny that expected persistence, or current fitness differences are any part of the explanatory applications of function in evolutionary biology.
18. Millikan, R. G., 1993. “ ‘Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox,’ in ”. In White Queen Psychology and other Essays for Alice Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. See esp. n. 10; and K. Neander, ‘Functions as Selected Effects.’
19. The British journal for the Philosophy of Science Although there are some problems with the formulation that Bigelow and Pargetter give to novel functions. See D.M. Walsh, ‘Fitness and Function,’ (forthcoming) for a discussion.
20. Brandon, R., 1990. Adaptation and Environment Princeton: Princeton University Press. (R.C. Richardson and R.M. Burian, A Defense of the Propensity Interpretations of Fitness,' Philosophy of Science Association1 (1992) 349–62
21. By ‘selective regime’ of a trait we mean the total set of abiological and biological (including social, developmental, and physiological) factors in the environment of the trait which potentially affect the fitness of individuals with that trait.
22. Walsh. ‘Fitness and Function’
23. Sober, E., 1984. The Nature of Selection Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. See (and Philosophy of Biology for the significance of selection for a trait.
24. R A single regime, may be both historical and current; when that is so, the function is both historical and current.
25. Millikan, R. G., 1993. “ ‘Propensities, Exaptations and the Brain,’ in ”. In White Queen Psychology and other Essays for Alice 13Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. emphasis in original
26. Neander, Including K., 1993. “ ‘The Teleological Notion of “Function”’; P. Kitcher, ‘Function and Design’; P. Godfrey-Smith, ‘Functions: Consensus without Unity’; R.G. Millikan ”. In White Queen Psychology; 409–22. E. Griffiths, ‘Functional Analysis and Proper Functions,’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science44 and R. Amundson and G. Lauder, ‘Function Without Purpose.’
27. Allen, C., and Bekoff, M., 1995. 'Biological Function, Adaptation, and Natural Design. Philosophy of Science, 62: 609–22. See There may well be an ahistorical sense of ‘design,’ but there is no ahistorical sense of ‘design by natural selection.’
28. This point is stressed by Godfrey-Smith in ‘Functions.’
29. We return to this question once we have developed our account of the C-f unction/E- function relation.
30. Millikan, R. G., Language, Thought, and other Biological Categories See ch. 1 and ‘In Defense of Proper Functions’; K. Neander, ‘Functions as Selected Effects.’
31. Cummins. 1995. (in a personal communication) made this point to us quite vividly. According to his (C-function) conception, ‘the function of hearts explains circulation, not hearts.’ E-function explanations, in contrast, are natural selection explanations. On what natural selection explains, see E. Sober, ‘Natural Selection and Distributive Explanation: A Reply to Neander,’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46: 384–97.
32. Junk, DNA. has an evolutionary function at the level of the gene. The E-function of junk DNA is to replicate itself. Replicating itself and having no fitness consequences for the individual has high fitness consequences for the junk DNA. Doing just that explains why junk DNA is present. These are the E-functions of junk DNA at the level of the gene.
33. Harvey may not have known he was discovering the E-function of the heart. Presumably he possessed neither the concept of fitness nor that of a selective regime. Nevertheless, he discovered (de re, so to speak) the E-function of the heart because he performed the kind of functional analysis by which E-functions are revealed.
34. 488 A similar point is made by P.E. Griffiths in ‘Functional Analysis and Proper Functions.’ For a superb example of how E-function is revealed by C-function analysis, see Kingsolver and Koehl's discussion of the function and evolution of insect wings: J.G. Kingsolver and M.A.R. Koehl, ‘Aerodynamics, Thermoregulation, and the Evolution of Insect Wings: Differential Scaling and Evolutionary Change,’ Evolution 39 (1985,–504
35. The functional analysis need not involve the token x itself.
36. Dennett, D. C., 1987. “ 'Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The “Panglossian Paradigm” Defended, in ”. In The Intentional Stance 237–86. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. at 278; italics in original. We thank an anonymous referee from this journal for raising this challenge.
37. Hall, B. K., ed. Homology: The Hierarchical Basis of Comparative Biology We happen to think, contra Millikan and Neander, that traits are not individuated by their E-functions. For biologists, trait types are defined by relations of homology. Lauder, for example, discusses the use of functions in cladogram construction (G.V. Lauder, ‘Homology, Form, and Function,’ in (San Diego: Academic Press 1994) 151–96). He concludes that sameness of function is evidence for— albeit defeasible evidence for— sameness of biological trait type. If sameness of function is defeasible evidence for sameness of biological trait type, then functions cannot be the criterion for individuating biological traits.
38. The Nature of Psychological Explanation See also Cummins's, 29.
39. Our claim here is reminiscent of a point made by Cummins. Arguing against a definition of function proposed by Nagel, Cummins says 'it would at most tell us which effects are picked out as functions; it would provide no hint as to why these effects are picked out as functions (‘Functional Analysis,’ 60; emphasis in original). This echoes our criticism of Amundson and Lauder's view quite nicely. They correctly identify which C-functions are attributed by anatomists and physiologists, but do not answer the question why these effects are picked out as functions.
40. These, we believe, are the functions most commonly ascribed in comparative anatomy and physiology, those functions discussed at length by Amundson and Lauder in ‘Function without Purpose.’
41. We expect examples of this sort to be rare.