Do outside directors monitor managers?. Evidence from tender offer bids

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 1992, Pages 195-221

  Byrd, John W ^a   Hickman, Kent A ^b  

^a FORT LEWIS COLLEGE   (United States)

^b GONZAGA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000106797     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(92)90018-S     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. The role of outside directors in major acquisitions and sales
2. Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition
3. Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms
4. The takeover market corporate board composition and ownership structure The case of banking
5. The market for corporate control: A review of the evidence
6. Boards of directors and corporate governance: The case of greenmail
7. Agency problems and the theory of the firm
8. The separation of ownership and control
9. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme
10. The market for corporate control The empirical evidence since 1980
11. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence
12. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure
13. Managerial performance, Tobin's q, and the gains from successful tender offers
14. Merger decisions and executive stock ownership in acquiring firms
15. Corporate acquisitions by listed firms The experience of a comprehensive sample
16. Mergers and the market for corporate control
17. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
18. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis
19. Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions?
20. Corporate performance and managerial renumeration: An empirical analysis
21. Why do not directors rock the boat?
22. Comments on the structure of ownership and the theory of the firm
23. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers
24. Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth
25. Management-board relationships takeover risk and the adoption of golden parachutes
26. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control
27. Corporate takeover bids methods of payment and bidding firms' stock returns
28. Outside directors and CEO turnover
29. The board of directors, management, and corporate takeovers: Opportunities and pitfalls
30. State law shareholder protection and the theory of the corporation