Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 1991, Pages 236-260

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Tirole, Jean ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000090836     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(91)90155-W     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite and infinite horizon games
2. On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
3. Sequential bargaining with incomplete information
4. Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria
5. Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players
6. Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players
7. Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players
8. Sequential equilibria
9. Bayesian equilibrium and incentive compatibility: An introduction
10. Multistage games with communication
11. A reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
12. A New Self-Enforcement Criterion for Extensive-Form Games