The choice of 'conservative' bankers in open economies: Monetary regime options for Europe

Economic Journal

Volumn 106, Issue 435, 1996, Pages 345-358

  Currie, David ^a   Levine, Paul ^a   Pearlman, Joseph ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000042036     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2235251     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Currie, D. A., Levine, P. L. and Pearlman, J. (1995). 'Can delegation be counterproductive? The choice of conservative bankers in open economies.' Department of Economics Discussion Paper, University of Surrey.
2. Dolado, J. J., Griffiths, M. and Padilla, A. J. (1994). 'Delegation in international monetary policy games.' European Economic Review, vol. 38, pp. 1057-70.
3. Fitoussi, J.-P., Atkinson, A. B., Flemming, J. S., Malinvaud, E., Phelps, E. S. and Solow, R. M. (1993). Competitive Disinflation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Laskar, D. (1989). 'Conservative central bankers in a two-country world.' European Economic Review, vol. 33, pp. 1575-95.
5. Rogoff, K. (1985a). 'The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target.' Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 100, pp. 1169-90.
6. Rogoff, K. (1985b). 'Can international monetary policy co-ordination be counterproductive?' Journal of International Economics, vol. 18, pp. 199-217.