The programme of the nationalist action party: An iron hand in a velvet glove?

Middle Eastern Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 120-134

  Arikan, E Burak ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0000003099     PISSN: 00263206     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00263209808701246     Document Type: Review

References (51)

1. According to Alparslan Türkeş, the ideal is to construct a Turkish nation that is the most advanced, civilized, and powerful entity of the world. People who follow this ideal, are the idealists. Idealists must be ready to sacrifice themselves in serving the state and the nation. See, Türkeş, Alparslan, Milliyetçilik (Istanbul: Hamle Basin-Yayin, 1996), p.16.
2. The splinter party is Büyük Birlik Partisi (Grand Unity Party, BBP) led by Muhsin Yazicioǧlu a former NAP member. The party emphasizes the Islamic roots of Turkish culture and advocates a Turkist-Islamist programme. For Yazicioǧlu and his friends Islam occupies a central role in Turkish nationalism, while for the NAP followers Islam is only one of the ingredients of Turkish nationalism among others.
3. Turkish word for 'Führer'.
4. For the pre-1980 MHP atrocities see the confessions of two Idealists, Omer Tanlak and Ali Yurtaslan. Tanlak, Omer, Itiraf: Eski Ülkücü MHP'yi Anlatiyor (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, Second Edition, 1996). Yurtaslan, Ali, Itiraflar: MHP Merkezindeki Adam Abdullah Catli'yi Anlatiyor (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, Second Edition, 1997).
5. For the pre-1980 MHP atrocities see the confessions of two Idealists, Omer Tanlak and Ali Yurtaslan. Tanlak, Omer, Itiraf: Eski Ülkücü MHP'yi Anlatiyor (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, Second Edition, 1996). Yurtaslan, Ali, Itiraflar: MHP Merkezindeki Adam Abdullah Catli'yi Anlatiyor (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, Second Edition, 1997).
6. Türkeş, Alparslan, Milliyetçilik, p.16.
7. The MHP administration denied such an illegal link and argued that such a person could not be a member of their community. However, his funeral was dominated by the Idealists, and he was claimed as a martyr who fought for the cause of Turkish nationalism.
8. The relationship between Abdullah Çatli and the MHP is explained in the confessions of Ali Yurtaslan. See, Yurtaslan. Ali, Itiraflar: MHP Merkezindeki Adam Abdullah Çatli'yi Anlatiyor.
9. Büyükbaş, Adnan, Ülkücüye Mektuplur (Istanbul: Hamle Basin-Yayin, 1995). I have rephrased the words of Adnan Buyukbaş, since a direct translation from Turkish to English turns out to be meaningless.
10. At the time the party used a different name, Milliyetçi Çalişma Partisi (Nationalist Work Party, MÇP), for the previous one was still banned from politics.
11. In order to pass the national threshold of ten per cent, an electoral pact between RP, MHP and a minor third party was formed before the 1991 general elections. Therefore, the results represents neither the electoral strength of the RP nor the MHP alone.
12. Coşkun, Bekir, Hürriyet, 8 April 1997, p.3.
13. DP government was ended by the 1960 military intervention and three ministers, including the prime minister, Adnan Menderes, were executed by the military junta. Alparslan Türkeş, as a colonel, was active during the early phases of the coup d'état.
14. The last one, RP, is at least considered to be an enemy by the top administration of the party. In his last interview before his death, to which the media gave extensive coverage, Alparslan Türkeş pointed at the threat of Islamic Fundamentalism represented by the RP.
15. Alparslan Türkeş , Milliyetçilik, p.17.
16. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Programi (Ankara, 24 Ocak 1993), pp.37-8.
17. This organization was the continuation of Türkçüler Derneǧi (Turkists Club), which was founded in 1963 by grassroot racists, such as Nihal Atsiz and İsmet Tümtürk.
18. Tanil Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket (Istanbul: İletişim Yayinlari, Third Edition, 1994), p.54.
19. Today's Islamist RP is the continuation of the MSP.
20. Bülent Ecevit at the time was the leader of CHP.
21. Dilipak, Abdurrahman, Türkiye Nereye Gidiyor? (Istanbul: Risale Yayinlari, 1988).
22. Bora, Tanil and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah, pp.152-3.
23. Ibid., pp.155.
24. For a summary of Nouvelle Droite's ideas on the matter, see Jim Wolfreys, 'The Programme of the National Front: An Iron Hand in a Velvet Glove', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 3 (July 1993).
25. Dilipak, Abdurrahman, Türkiye Nereye Gidiyor?
26. Turkish-Islamic synthesis section is primarily adapted from, Tanil Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah, pp.160-77.
27. Ömer Laçiner, 'Foreword', Tanil Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet. Ocak, Dergah, p.10. The interviews conducted with 870 MHP voters as to how they had become supporters of the movement in the late 1970s reveals that only 30 per cent of them voted for the party with pure anti-Communist motives. Here one needs to stress that during this period anti-Communist sentiments were at their peak in Turkey. For the results of the interviews see Mustafa Çalik, MHP Hareketi, -kaynaklari ve gelişimi-, 1965-1980 (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 1995), pp.149-61.
28. Ömer Laçiner, 'Foreword', Tanil Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet. Ocak, Dergah, p.10. The interviews conducted with 870 MHP voters as to how they had become supporters of the movement in the late 1970s reveals that only 30 per cent of them voted for the party with pure anti-Communist motives. Here one needs to stress that during this period anti-Communist sentiments were at their peak in Turkey. For the results of the interviews see Mustafa Çalik, MHP Hareketi, -kaynaklari ve gelişimi-, 1965-1980 (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 1995), pp.149-61.
29. Jim Wolfreys, 'The Programme of the National Front: An Iron Hand in a Velvet Glove'.
30. An outlawed Kurdish terrorist organization which fights for a free Kurdistan, including lands from Turkey. Iraq, Iran and Syria.
31. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Programi (Ankara, 24 Ocak 1993), pp.16-8.
32. Alparslan Türkeş, Milliyetçilik, p.19.
33. The FN programme is referred to as 'an iron hand in a velvet glove' by the organization itself. See E. Plenel and A. Rollat, La République Menacée (Paris, 1992), p.248 cited in Wolfreys, 'The Programme of the National Front'.
34. The FN programme is referred to as 'an iron hand in a velvet glove' by the organization itself. See E. Plenel and A. Rollat, La République Menacée (Paris, 1992), p.248 cited in Wolfreys, 'The Programme of the National Front'.
35. For instance, both the FN in France, and the Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (Freedom Party of Austria, FPO), have adopted economic liberalism in their programmes. For the FN, see Wolfreys, 'The Programme of the National Front'. For the FPO, see FPO, Programm für Wien 1991 (Vienna: Landesgruppe Wien, 1991).
36. Wolfreys, 'The Programme of the National Front'.
37. Bizim Ocak, May 1990, p.3, cited in Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah, p.349.
38. Bizim Ocak, May 1990, p.3, cited in Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah, p.349.
39. For a more detailed analysis of the 'agriculture cities', see Tahsin, Yahyaoǧlu, Tarim Kentleri-Milliyetçi Toplumcu Düzen (Dokuz Işik Üzerine Incelemeler) (Istanbul: Milli Ülkü Yayinevi, 1975).
40. See below on family and moral values.
41. The average increase in the population in Turkey is 2.4 per cent per year.
42. The MHP is against Marxist or Socialist trade unions.
43. Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Programi (Ankara, 24 Ocak 1993), p.8.
44. Ibid., pp.12-13.
45. For a detailed analysis of how the 1980 military coup affected the Idealist cadres see, Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah, pp.101-47.
46. For a detailed analysis of the MHP's interpretation of Turkish history, see Türkeş, Milliyetçilik, pp.29-40.
47. Mustafa Çalik, MHP Hareketi, -kaynaklari ve gelişimi-, 1965-1980 (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 1995), pp.133-4.
48. Ibid., backcover.
49. Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştirmalar Vakfi (TÜSES), Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabani (Ankara: Cem Yayinevi, 1995), pp.47-8.
50. For instance, when women's associations marched against sharia rule, the leader of ANAP, Mesut Yilmaz, stated that they do not support a march against sharia rule, because it can be interpreted as a march against religion.
51. The party changed its name to Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance, AN).